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I.  INTRODUCTION: COMPETING REALITIES OF JUVENILE JUSTICE FOR 
THE SHOW-ME STATE 
For years Missouri has been touted as a model for juvenile justice.  
Stakeholders and commentators continually declare that the Show-Me State – 
with its “Missouri Model” – employs the most modern and innovative ap-
proaches when it comes to treatment of court-involved youth.  This account is 
reflected in press coverage, television news shows, and agency white papers.  
But this is only part of the picture; there is much more happening in Missouri 
when it comes to juveniles.  However, this “other” part of the story seldom 
has been openly discussed – until now.1   
From failing schools, to deeply conflicted court structures, to a shortage 
of free representation, Missouri’s most vulnerable children must contend with 
outdated and deficient systems of support as they make their way to adult-
hood.  As was discussed at the University of Missouri School of Law’s recent 
symposium relating to the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in 
Miller v. Alabama,2 this reality stands in stark contrast to a commitment to 
evolving standards of decency of a modern society.  For too many Missouri 
youth daily life includes ongoing indignities, deprivation of legal protections, 
and denial other basic rights – including one of the most fundamental features 
of our shared human experience – that is, the right to hope.3   In fact, as this 
  
 1. As this Article goes to press, one recent event is unfolding that may          
help shed greater light on the “other” Missouri Model and lead the way to the kinds  
of reforms called for in this paper.  On November 18, 2013, the United States      
Department of Justice announced that it launched an investigation into the workings 
of Missouri’s largest juvenile court system, the St. Louis County Juvenile Court.   
That investigation is focused on two main issues – potential due process deprivations 
and racial disparities within the system.  Department of Justice Announces Investiga-
tion of the St. Louis County Family Court, U.S. DEP’T JUST.  (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-crt-1232.html.  See also David 
Carroll, US DOJ Investigating St. Louis Family Courts, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER, 
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/us-doj-investigating-st-louis-family-courts/ 
(suggesting that the investigation will have state-wide implications given the structure 
of Missouri’s juvenile courts and the pervasive nature of due process and other prob-
lems documented in recent reports). 
 2. Remarks and papers delivered at the symposium, entitled Bombshell or Baby 
Step, sought to address a wide range of issues relating to the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012), and are contained in this special symposium issue.  See generally Symposium, 
Bombshell or Baby Step, 78 MO. L. REV. 3 (2013). 
 3. See Vintner & Others v. United Kingdom, [2013] ECHR 645 (09 July), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2013/645.html, (holding that life 
without parole sentences violate the European Convention on Human Rights and that 
all prisoners deserve the right to have to some possibility of release); see also id. 
(Judge Power-Forde, concurring) (“Article 3 [of the European Convention on Human 
Rights] encompasses what might be described as ‘the right to hope’. . . hope is an 
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Article goes to press eighty-four of Missouri’s young people – some as young 
as fourteen years old – have been mandatorily sentenced to die in Missouri’s 
maximum security prisons.4  
This Article seeks to contrast the rosy picture painted on the national 
level – one that suggests a model system of juvenile justice from top to bot-
tom – with the more troubling day-to-day problems facing youth in Mis-
souri’s communities, courts, and institutions of confinement.  This examina-
tion is rooted in my own recent experiences.  Like others who attended the 
symposium, I am an academic who teaches about the theories underlying 
Supreme Court decisions like Miller.  However, I also run a youth advocacy 
clinic in the real world of St. Louis, Missouri.  
Thus what follows is not a theoretical analysis of the implications         
of Miller.  Rather, it is an account of the law as lived by Missouri’s most  
vulnerable youth – from kids in Missouri’s local trial courts to individuals 
serving mandatory juvenile life sentences without any opportunity for parole.  
It is informed by the work of Washington University School of Law’s Juve-
nile Law and Justice Clinic (JLJC), a law school clinic engaged in youth  
advocacy efforts in St. Louis, Missouri.5  And it argues it is time to shed light 
on the “other” Missouri Model of juvenile justice – and fundamentally reform 
the system.  
Part II of this Article examines some of the most well-known claims 
about the Missouri Model of juvenile justice, clarifying that the positive press 
to date actually describes only one small component of the larger juvenile 
justice structure: Missouri’s system of residential correction for state-placed 
adjudicated youth.  And while that system has much to admire and replicate, 
it also has room for improvement. 
  
important and constitutive aspect of the human person.  Those who commit the most 
abhorrent and egregious of acts and who inflict untold suffering upon others, never-
theless retain their fundamental humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to 
change.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Jackson, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-
9647), 2012 WL 928360 (Justice Sotomayor asked, “What hope does he have?”).  
 4. See Ed Pilkington, Jailed for Life at Age 14: US Supreme Court to Consider 
Juvenile Sentences, GUARDIAN, (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.theguardian. 
com/law/2012/mar/19/supreme-court-juvenile-life-sentences (describing the case of 
Quantel Lotts, a St. Louis, Missouri youth sentenced at age fourteen to a mandatory 
death behind bars sentence). 
 5. JLJC was launched five years ago by this author with the assistance of Lec-
turer in Law Kathryn Pierce and our colleague, Professor Annette Appel, who now 
runs a separate child welfare clinic.  While the course has been offered under different 
names, its mission has remained the same: to have student attorneys engage in a wide 
range of innovative advocacy efforts on behalf of St. Louis youth.  See Juvenile Law 
and Justice Clinic Information, WASH. U. L., http://law.wustl.edu/civiljustice/pages. 
aspx?id=8878 [hereinafter JLJC Website] (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).  Employing a 
holistic approach, our advocacy takes place not only in juvenile courts, but schools, 
the child welfare system, administrative proceedings, municipal, criminal and appel-
late courts, and in post-dispositional and post-conviction proceedings.  Id. 
3
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In Part III, this Article fills in what has been left out of most public and 
press stories about Missouri’s larger youth justice system.  That is, despite 
mostly glowing media accounts, Missouri’s at-risk youth are poorly served by 
several overlapping broken entities.  It focuses first on Missouri’s failing 
education system, which is made worse by punitive policing and push-out 
practices.  It then examines Missouri’s conflicted and outdated juvenile court 
system, a structure that appears to be unconstitutional in its entirety.  It de-
scribes Missouri’s nearly non-existent indigent juvenile defense system, a 
system that has resulted in young people all too frequently defending them-
selves in Missouri’s courts.  Finally, it explains how children are too easily 
sent to Missouri’s adult prisons – many banished to die there without anyone 
ever hearing their stories.   
Part IV calls upon stakeholders to move beyond the rhetoric and own up 
to the ways in which the state is failing its most needy children.  By meaning-
fully implementing Miller’s evolving standards mandate for every child – no 
matter when, where, or to whom they were born – we can begin to deliver 
true juvenile justice.  And in the days that follow Missouri might actually 
become a model system, one that is committed to a single vision of common 
decency – and hope – for all of its children. 
II.  THE “MISSOURI MODEL” – DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES AS 
PART OF THE STORY 
A Google query with the words “the Missouri Model” yields over 
80,000 results.6  These include a New York Times article,7 a piece on 
CNN.com,8 and coverage by ABC’s Primetime.9  Indeed, most of the entries 
paint a picture of a juvenile justice system that is kinder, gentler, and far more 
innovative than others around the country.10  It is a system that has been 
  
 6. In .22 seconds, on May 23, 2013, a Google search for "the Missouri Model" 
produced 80,100 “hits.”  See GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/#q=%22the+Mis-
souri+Model%22  (last visited May 23, 2013). 
 7. See Solomon Moore, Missouri System Treats Juvenile Offenders with Lighter 
Hand, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 2009, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2009/03/27/us/27juvenile.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 8. See Stephanie Chen, Teen Offenders Find a Future in Missouri, 
CNN.COM/CRIME (Aug. 27, 2009, 10:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/ 
08/25/missouri.juvenile.offenders/. 
 9. See Joseph Diaz, Missouri Sets New Standard for Juvenile Detention, ABC 
NEWS (Sept. 9, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/missouri-sets-standard-
juvenile-detention/story?id=8510425&singlePage=true. 
 10. See, e.g., Thomas Lee, The Old Way vs. The “Missouri Model”, W. 
HAYWOOD BURNS INST. FOR JUV. JUST. FAIRNESS & EQUITY (July 16, 2009), 
http://www.burnsinstitute.org/article.php?id=138 (comparing a traditional youth cor-
rectional facility in California with one based on the Missouri Model).  
4
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called a “guiding light,”11 a national model,12 and even “the Missouri Mira-
cle” 13 given its dedication to helping youth succeed.14   
But it is important to take note of what is really being described by these 
accounts – it is Missouri’s Division of Youth Services (DYS).  DYS is an 
executive branch agency, part of the state’s larger Department of Social Ser-
vices, which provides care for young people found guilty of wrongdoing who 
have been placed in the state’s custody by court order.15  In other words, DYS 
is the state’s “juvenile corrections agency.”16  With all of the press and atten-
tion, it is easy to overlook the fact that only a small part of Missouri’s justice 
system for youth is actually considered a model in its features – a part that 
impacts only a minor percentage of court-involved youth. 
The DYS Missouri Model was established in the 1980s under the lead-
ership of then-Executive Director Mark Steward.17  At that time, the agency 
decided to rethink its approach to state-placement, which was seen as the 
mere “warehousing” of youth in grim facilities without much in the way of 
treatment – and without regard for their futures.18  Missouri was not alone in 
  
 11. RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF 
REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 4 (2010), available at http://www.aecf. 
org/upload/publicationfiles/MOSummarywebfinal.pdf [hereinafter MENDEL, RE-
INVENTING REHABILITATING]. 
 12. AMANDA PETTERUTI ET AL., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD 
JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE GOOD FISCAL SENSE 9 (2009), available                
at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_CostsofConfinement 
_JJ_P.pdf. 
 13. See Marian Wright Edelman, Juvenile Justice Reform: Making the “Missouri 
Model” an American Model, CHILD. DEF. FUND (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www. chil-
drensdefense.org/newsroom/child-watch-columns/child-watch-documents/juve-nile-
justice-reform-mo-model.html; Robert Winters, Back to the Future: New Attempts to 
Implement a Proven Model in Juvenile Justice, CORRECTIONS.COM (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www.corrections.com/news/article/32385-back-to-the-future-new-attempts-to-
implement-a-proven-model-in-juvenile-justice. 
 14. MO. APPROACH, http://missouriapproach.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) 
(declaring that “[i]n Missouri, we now operate on the belief that all youth desire to do 
well and succeed”). 
 15. Who We Are, MO. APPROACH, http://missouriapproach.org/approach (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 16. MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 5. 
 17. Our Staff, MO. YOUTH SERVICES INST., http://mysiconsulting.org/staff.php 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013).  Notably, as will be discussed further below, Steward 
now runs a non-profit that helps to export the concept of the “Missouri Model” to 
other jurisdictions.  See infra note 31. 
 18. See generally DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN LIFE: THE 
HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI 196-207 (2003); see also MENDEL, 
REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 15 (describing how the notoriously 
problematic Boonville Training School for Boys was ultimately closed in Missouri 
and replaced by smaller facilities run by DYS). 
5
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its use of such practices as many other jurisdictions did the same – or worse.19  
But Missouri took the lead in establishing smaller, dormitory-style residential 
treatment facilities across the state.20   
Contrasted with old-fashioned, workhouse-like facilities or youth cor-
rectional centers with concrete cells for sleeping spaces, many of today’s 
DYS facilities have outdoor spaces for youth residents to explore, comforta-
ble living areas with bunk beds and furniture, and little in the way of barbed 
wire.21  Given the greater number of facilities, children can remain closer to 
family and friends in the community.22  This arrangement ideally allows for 
more contact and visits.23  The entire living experience is intended to be more 
youth-friendly, humane, and future-focused.24       
DYS also embraces a kind of milieu therapy to modify the negative be-
haviors of its residents.  For instance, it now deploys group-based therapeutic 
interventions – often led by youth residents – rather than harsh individualized 
punishments, such as shackling or solitary confinement, to address negative 
actions on a day-to-day basis.25  It has become well-known for its “circle up” 
sessions, during which teens come together to address the alleged wrongdo-
  
 19. RICHARD MENDEL, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN CONNECTICUT: HOW 
COLLABORATION AND COMMITMENT HAVE IMPROVED PUBLIC SAFETY AND OUTCOMES 
FOR YOUTH (2012), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/ 
documents/jpi_juvenile_justice_reform_in_ct.pdf (describing poor conditions for 
children in Connecticut’s juvenile justice system prior to the 1990s); Juvenile Justice, 
EVERY CHILD FOUND., http://everychildfoundation.org/policy-advocacy/current-
focus-areas/ (follow “Juvenile Justice” dropdown box) (urging California lawmakers 
to improve juvenile corrections centers to “not simply warehouse [youth] under min-
imally tolerable conditions”) (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 20. MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 15 (comparing 
Boonville with 650 beds to more modern DYS cottages that generally house fewer 
than fifty residents). 
 21. DYS’s immediate past Executive Director, Tim Decker, has noted that 
“[v]isitors to Missouri DYS facilities are inevitably surprised by the calm and home-
like nature of the programs . . . .  Safety and security is enhanced by creating a hu-
mane culture of care.  This is ultimately what keeps young people safe, not hardware, 
fences, or cameras.”  TIM DECKER, TESTIMONY TO THE PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION 
ACT (PREA) PANEL 2-4 (June 3, 2012), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/reviewpanel/pdfs_june10/testimony_decker.pdf.  Hogan Street, the state’s maxi-
mum security facility located in the middle of the City of St. Louis, does have barbed 
wire fences. 
 22. ABRAMS, supra note 18, at 205 (stating that most youth placed with DYS are 
“treated within thirty to fifty miles of their homes so their families and other sources 
of community support can remain involved in their lives”).  
 23. See MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 15. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 9 (describing the “mechanical restraints” and “isolation” techniques 
used in other jurisdictions to address behaviors of youth in state correctional centers). 
6
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ings of their DYS peers.26  Under this model, youth are empowered to deploy 
behavior modification strategies within the community.27  Rather than having 
staff members use pepper spray or mechanical restraints on misbehaving 
youth, residents are called upon to diffuse problem situations and engage in 
physical holds of their peers where necessary.28   
These practices are now replicated across the country, with policy-
makers and juvenile justice professionals calling for an even greater embrace 
of the “Missouri Model.”  For instance, in Texas and California officials are 
testing similar practices within their own programs to reduce the number of 
young people in prison-like settings.29  Youth advocacy organizations like the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Children’s Defense Fund are urging 
adoption of Missouri’s kinder approach to youth confinement.30  And even 
DYS continues to work on exporting its practices to other states.31 
While breaking new ground with many of its approaches, some DYS 
methods and claims are not without controversy.  For instance, many youth 
and their families question the program’s use of residents to administer disci-
pline and physically restrain each other.32  Others wonder about the depth of 
  
 26. See Moore, supra note 7 (teenage girl recounts use of “circle-up” methods in 
her DYS unit). 
 27. Tim Decker, Panel Presentation on Trauma Informed Care at the Council of 
Juvenile Correctional Administrators (CJCA) Winter Meeting in San Antonio, Texas 
(Jan. 29, 2011), available at http://missouriapproach.org/storage/documents/ mo-
dys_ppt_20110129_cjca_trauma_informed_care.pdf (describing DYS efforts of 
“therapeutic intervention, youth development, and social-emotional competence 
through group ‘circles’” and other techniques).  
 28. Moore, supra note 7 (“Pepper spray is banned, and youths are taught to de-
escalate fights or apply grappling holds, a form of restraint.”). 
 29. Id.  
 30. See Edelman, supra note 13; MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra 
note 11, at 2.  
 31. See, e.g., Texas & Cayman Islands Visit, MO. APPROACH, http:// mis-
souriapproach.org/presentations/texas-cayman-islands-visit.html (DYS presentations 
delivered in Kansas City to the State of Texas and the Cayman Islands) (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2013); Press Room, MO. YOUTH SERVICES INST., http://www.mysiconsult-
ing.org/press_room.php (MYSI Executive Director Mark Steward, a former head of 
DYS, describes his mission now as being “a passionate advocate and systems change 
agent to support and develop the best juvenile justice system that is sustainable and 
based on promising/effective practices.”) (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 32. Mary Moloney, Youth Facility Delmina Woods Uses Group Restraint to 
Calm Students, KSPR ABC 33 NEWS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://articles.kspr.com/2012-
04-20/facility_31380391 (family member of DYS resident shares that “I think that 
asking a child to participate in another person's punishment is . . . beyond cruel and 
unusual punishment”).  In addition, our JLJC clients have asked us why restraining 
other youth is a part of their treatment program and complain that some young people 
abuse the power they are given under such a model, “pushing limits” of other youth in 
order to bring on a physical intervention. 
7
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the program’s therapeutic offerings33 and its reportedly high rate of success in 
preventing recidivism.34  In addition, as a largely self-contained entity, 
courts35 and juvenile defense attorneys36 do not play a regular role in over-
sight or post-dispositional proceedings for youth under DYS’s jurisdiction.  
However, DYS attempts to take stock of possible shortcomings.37  By 
statute it is required to seek ongoing input about its programs from an adviso-
ry board.38 And the administration does engage informally with others about 
  
 33. Dugan Arnett & Mark Morris, Maryville Case Puts Missouri Juvenile Justice 
System Under the Microscope, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.kansas 
city.com/2013/12/07/4677557/maryville-case-puts-missouri-juvenile.html.  
 34. MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 8 (“Some observ-
ers have questioned Missouri’s results, citing the fact that nearly half of the youth in 
the DYS population do not have a felony as their committing offense.”); see also 
AMY KORENSTEIN, A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MISSOURI MODEL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
MISSOURI MODEL IN COMPARISON TO THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES 6 
(2006), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/committees/study/2008/JUVE/ 
files/Missouri_final_report.pdf (“The definition [of recidivism] being used by MDYS 
in their annual reports considers the percent of commitments that are recommitments. 
. . . [T]his definition is a fairly limited definition of recidivism; it does not track what 
happens to a cohort of youth after they are discharged.”). 
 35. Once a child is ordered into DYS care, the juvenile court is generally divest-
ed of jurisdiction over the child.  MO. REV. STAT. § 211.041 (2012); § 219.081 
(2000).  Therefore, the judge, prosecution, and child’s attorney do not participate in 
ongoing placement review hearings, as in the case in some other jurisdictions, or have 
the ability to seek recourse from the dispositional court if things are not going well.  
Rather, the duration of a child’s stay is entirely determined by the DYS staff, which 
also has the ability to move the child from facility to facility, create the child’s plan of 
service, and impose disciplinary sanctions – all without regular oversight or input by 
advocates for the youth.   See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. TIT. 13 § 110-2.110 (2013). 
 36. As a recommended best practice, JLJC offers to remain on client cases 
through placement and re-entry.  See Sandra Simkins, Marty Beyer, & Lisa M. Geis, 
The Harmful Use of Isolation in Juvenile Facilities: The Need for Post-Disposition 
Representation, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2012).  However, JLJC is one of the 
few groups in Missouri to offer such post-dispositional services.  See JLJC Website, 
supra note 8.  Thus DYS initially was confused by our continuing legal representation 
of state-placed youth.   
 37. See, e.g., MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 8 (de-
scribing how DYS has considered and counters questions about recidivism statistics). 
 38. Missouri law requires DYS to maintain a bipartisan advisory board of fifteen 
members appointed by the DYS director.  MO. REV. STAT. § 219.046(1) (2000).  By 
statute it must be composed of “public officials, professionals, and representatives of 
the general public who possess knowledge and experience in health, education, social, 
correctional, or legal services for children.”  § 219.046(2) (2000).  Notably, the cur-
rent Board is “comprised of judges, former legislators, civic officials, and concerned 
citizens.”  Division of Youth Services: DYS Frequently Asked Questions, MO. DEP’T 
SOC. SERVICES, http://www.dss.mo.gov/dys/faq/genopt.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 
2013).  As will be further discussed, infra, it does not appear to include a single mem-
ber of the juvenile defense bar – an attorney specially trained in providing quality 
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how to maintain successes and improve in the future.39  This picture stands in 
stark contrast to the startling historic deficits and dysfunction that plague 
other components of Missouri’s youth law and justice systems and that are 
largely ignored by the press and other accounts.40    
As noted, DYS is merely a single part of the state’s complex of govern-
mental branches and units intended to deal with at-risk youth and those         
in conflict with the law.41  Its services and programming reach just a “small 
minority of youth offenders who must be removed from the community to 
protect public safety.”42  Indeed, in fiscal year 2011 only 951 Missouri    
youth were ultimately committed to DYS.43  This number reflects just a frac-
tion of the nearly 35,000 delinquency and status offense matters that were 
referred to Missouri’s juvenile courts in 2011 and the 6,953 youth housed 
locally in Missouri’s prison-like secure detention centers during the same 
year.44  This limited snapshot also overlooks the nearly 2,000 youthful of-
fenders presently incarcerated in Missouri’s adult prisons,45 including eighty-
four youth sentenced to mandatory life without parole prison terms46 – sen-
  
representation for juveniles and knowledgeable about emerging best legal practices.  
See Missouri Division of Youth Services Advisory Board, MO. APPROACH, 
http://missouriapproach.org/dys-advisory-board (last visited Nov. 13, 2013). 
 39. For instance, over the past five years Tim Decker, DYS’s immediate past 
Executive Director, and his administration have repeatedly assisted JLJC by attending 
conferences, participating in trainings, and sharing information with our faculty and 
student attorneys.  See, e.g., Evolving Standards of Justice: Symposium Explores Past, 
Present, and Future of Juvenile Justice, WASH. U. L., http://law.wustl.edu/ 
news/pages.aspx?id=9131 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (noting DYS participation in 
the clinic’s juvenile justice symposium).   
 40. See infra Part III.  
 41. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.  
 42. MENDEL, REINVENTING REHABILITATING, supra note 11, at 5. 
 43. MO. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES: ANNUAL    
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2011 1 (2011), available at http://www.dss.mo.gov/re/ 
pdf/dys/youth-services-annual-report-fy12.pdf [hereinafter DYS ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2011]. 
 44. See MO. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADM’R, MISSOURI JUVENILE AND FAMILY 
DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT CALENDAR 2011 7, 30 (2011), available at 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=4133 [hereinafter MJFD ANNUAL REPORT 
2011].  Note that while the Missouri Office of State Court administration maintains 
juvenile justice data by calendar year, the Missouri Division of Youth Services reports 
such data for the fiscal year.  See supra note 43.  
 45. MO. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, LIST OF OFFENDERS IN PRISON UNDER AGE 17 
AT THE TIME OF THEIR OFFENSE (on file with author). 
 46. See, e.g., Meghann Mollerus, Ruling Could Free 84 Juveniles Serving Life 
Without Parole, KOMU (Nov. 12, 2012, 1:39 PM), http://www.komu.com/ 
news/exclusive-ruling-could-free-84-juveniles-serving-life-without-parole-37606/. 
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tences that are now unlawful under the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
decision in Miller v. Alabama.47  
Thus the vast majority of Missouri youth who come in contact with law 
enforcement or juvenile justice officials do not experience DYS’s famous 
Missouri Model.  Instead, DYS operates side-by-side with state education, 
juvenile court, attorney appointment, and criminal justice programs that offer 
far less in the way of exemplary practices.48  In fact, as the account below 
suggests, these features of Missouri’s juvenile justice system are arguably 
some of the worst in the country when it comes to respecting the rights of 
youth and improving their life chances.49    
What follows is a description and analysis of the operations of these de-
ficient systems, based in part on my experiences running the JLJC clinic.  
These on-the-ground observations have convinced me that these units – both 
separately and together – too often serve as pathways to imprisonment for 
Missouri’s young people, rather than bridges to empowerment.  This phe-
nomenon has an acute impact on Missouri’s minority youth in particular.  
These lesser-known features of Missouri’s juvenile justice system are what I 
refer to as the “other” Missouri Model.  
III.  THE “OTHER” MISSOURI MODEL 
A.  Collapsing Schools and Criminalizing Childhood 
1. Educational Inadequacies 
Missouri’s education system has a long history of failure.  Despite the 
fact that the state’s constitution – unlike many others – provides young    
people with a fundamental right to education,50 this promise is shallow at 
best.  Fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, Missouri schools remain 
some of the most segregated in the country.51  They are also some of the most 
poorly performing in the nation on a range of measures, with some of the 
worst educational experiences afforded to poor and minority youth in Mis-
souri’s inner cities.52   
  
 47. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).   
 48. See discussion infra Part III. 
 49. See discussion infra Part III. 
 50. See MO. CONST., art. IX, § 1(a). 
 51. See, e.g., Kimberly Jade Norwood, Minnie Liddell’s Forty-Year Quest for 
Quality Public Education Remains a Dream Deferred, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 
58 (2012) (documenting that more than eighty percent of St. Louis City public school 
students are African-American). 
 52. See, e.g., SHOW-ME INSTITUTE ANNUAL REPORT, 2012 14 (2012), available 
at http://showmeinstitute.org/document-repository/doc_download/439-show-me-insti-
tute-annual-report-2012.html (stating that Missouri ranks in the bottom half of states 
for educational achievement). 
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For instance, according to a Center on Education Policy study, during 
the 2010-2011 school year Missouri ranked forty-ninth in the country in 
terms of satisfying No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) requirements.53  By the 
state’s own figures, eighty-eight percent of its schools did not satisfy NCLB 
yearly progress measures.54  In raw numbers, that means 1,916 of the state’s 
2,088 public schools were considered educationally substandard.55  Only 
Florida had a higher percentage of educationally deficient schools, with 
eighty-nine percent of its schools failing NCLB requirements.56 
While NCLB has been criticized for possibly exacerbating the problems 
facing poor school districts,57 many of Missouri’s public schools are failures 
by even the state’s own performance standards.  In 2011 Kansas City Public 
Schools lost accreditation from the Missouri Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education (DESE).58  Thereafter two school districts near St. Lou-
is – Normandy and Riverview Gardens – also joined the failure list.59   
Reminiscent of the desegregation strategies of the 1960s, children         
in these unaccredited districts – mostly poor, black youth – must now contend 
with great challenges to simply try to avail themselves of basic edu-      
cational rights.60  This includes getting up before sunrise to be bussed to dif-
  
 53. See ALEXANDRA USHER, CTR. ON EDUC., POLICY, AYP RESULTS FOR 2010-11 
4-7 (2011), available at http://www.cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID 
=386 (follow “Report” hyperlink). 
 54. Id. at 6. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 5.  A report released last year found Missouri is ranked forty-seventh in 
terms of similar student performance rankings.  MATTHEW LADNER & DAVE 
MYSLINSKI, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, REPORT CARD ON 
AMERICAN EDUCATION: RANKING STATE K-12 PERFORMANCE, PROGRESS AND 
REFORM 66 (18th ed. 2013), available at http://www.alec.org/docs/ReportCard_ 
18_Edition. 
 57. See Sarah Jane Forman, Ghetto Education, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y        
67, 113 (2012); Mae C. Quinn, The Fallout from Our Blackboard Battlegrounds:      
A Call for Withdrawal and a New Way Forward, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541, 
549-50 (2012). 
 58. Chris Blank, Kansas City Schools Lose State Accreditation, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 9, 2011, 9:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/21/kansas-
city-schools-lose-_n_973770.html; see also Ben Wieder, School Accreditation Ex-
plained: Does a Seal of Approval Matter?, STATELINE (Oct. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/school-accreditation-explained-
does-a-seal-of-approval-matter-85899375290. 
 59. MO. DEP’T OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., ACCREDITATION 
CLASSIFICATION 14 (2012), available at http://dese.mo.gov/divimprove/sia/msip/ 
documents/qs-si-msip-accreditationclassification10162012.pdf. 
 60. See, e.g., John Eligon, In Missouri, Race Complicates a Transfer to Better 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A10, available at http://www. ny-
times.com/2013/08/01/us/in-missouri-race-complicates-a-transfer-to-better-schools. 
html?page wanted=all&_r=0 (One Normandy parent lamented, “When I saw them 
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ferent school districts, often over the objection of students and parents in the 
receiving schools.61  
As this Article heads to press, eleven other Missouri school districts 
have only provisional status as accredited.62  But DESE recently rolled out a 
new evaluation system for school districts which may result in even more 
failures announced in the future.63  Under the new system, which assesses 
performance in a more nuanced way than the fourteen-point scale previously 
used, numerous additional districts will likely move into the provisionally-
accredited or failing range.64   
The St. Louis City Public School District, which only recently received 
provisional accreditation after repeatedly falling short of prior requirements, 
will likely receive failing scores again under the new standards.65  In fact, St. 
Louis Public Schools have been so problematic that the state took over opera-
tions in 2007.66  This was after the district in four years cycled through six 
superintendents who collectively drove the district into $25 million of debt.67  
This is further proof of the struggles facing poor and minority urban youth in 
  
screaming and hollering like they were crazy, I thought to myself, ‘Oh my God, this is 
back in Martin Luther King days.’”). 
 61. See, e.g., Jessica Bock, Long, Exhausting Day for 11-Year-Old Normandy 
Transfer Student, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 9, 2013, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/long-exhausting-day-for--year-old-
normandy-transfer-student/article_edc091ee-91fb-5c84-8d74-40b38245dc08.html.  
 62. Jessica Bock, Mehlville, Parkway, Pattonville and Rockwood: About Those 
Perfect Scores…, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 11, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://www. 
stltoday.com/news/local/education/mehlville-parkway-pattonville-and-rockwood-
about-those-perfect-scores/article_006a088f-5c56-530a-be2b-b23d16cefb20.html 
[hereinafter Bock, About Those Perfect Scores]. 
 63. Id.; see also Jessica Bock, New Ratings for Missouri Public Schools Offer 
Broader Picture of Student Performance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 23, 2013, 
3:30 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/new-ratings-for-missouri-s-
public-schools-offer-a-broader/article_7d3487e6-699b-552b-9348-0ef73bb5818a. 
html (For instance, “state officials previously scored schools on their overall attend-
ance rate, or the percentage of students in school daily[,]” but “[n]ow, the state looks 
at what percentage of students are in school 90 percent of the time.”). 
 64. Bock, About Those Perfect Scores, supra notes 62. 
 65. Jessica Bock, State Education Board Grants St. Louis Schools Provision-
al Accreditation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 26, 2012, 4:02 PM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/state-education-board-grants-st-louis-
schools-provisional-accreditation/article_259d84db-ab24-5f2a-8838-01be312b2a7e. 
html; see also Marshall Griffin & Maria Altman, St. Louis Schools Score in “Unac-
credited” Range Under New Grading Scale but Won’t Lose Accreditation, ST. LOUIS 
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 23, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/st-louis-
schools-score-unaccredited-range-under-new-grading-scale-wont-lose-accreditation. 
 66. Malcolm Gay, State Takes Control of Troubled Public Schools in St. Louis, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/23/us/23mis-
souri.html?_r=0. 
 67. Id. 
12
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Missouri, as these students are continually placed in some of the worst educa-
tional systems in the state.68 
2.  Safe Schools Act Problems 
Although behind the curve on most educational quality measures, Mis-
souri schools are ahead of other jurisdictions in at least one way: punishment 
and policing under Missouri’s ever-expanding Safe Schools Act practices.  
Following a 1980s movement spurred by a promise of federal funding, nearly 
every state in the nation now has some form of a Safe Schools Act to address 
school-based violence.69  Today, both the laws enacted under the Act and the 
ways in which they are enforced in Missouri reflect a commitment to punitive 
measures and push-out practices.  The application of the laws has resulted in 
a spectrum of overwhelmingly negative direct and indirect consequences for 
youth, both as a result of the express legislative provisions that have been 
amended over time, as well as the outgrowths of the tough-on-crime energy 
that the laws generated.  As with Missouri’s substandard educational offer-
ings, these practices disproportionately impact poor students of color.  
Starting in the late 1980s, a powerful narrative about the dangers of 
youth possessing of drugs and guns began to fill the nation’s airwaves.70  At 
about the same time the federal government stepped up its efforts to encour-
age local policing and punishment in the country’s public schools.71  Con-
gress passed the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act 
(SDFSCA), which became the first in a long line of laws providing financial 
  
 68. Id. (recounting that St. Louis City schools were supposed to be serving many 
homeless and poor youth); Children’s Educ. Alliance of Mo., Map of Failing School 
Districts, CEAMTEAM.ORG (June 11, 2013), http://www.ceamteam.org/map-of-failing-
districts/ (mapping demonstrates that “failing school districts are not only a problem 
in Missouri’s urban centers, but that they are present all over the state of Missouri”). 
 69. See Quinn, supra note 57, at 543. 
 70. See Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young 
Black Males in America, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 290-92 (2012) (describing 
how the nation’s war on drugs and crime focused on poor, minority communities in 
the 1980s). 
 71. See Edith Fairman Cooper, The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communi-
ties Program: Background and Context, in SAFE AND DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS 41, 43 
(Patricia Noble ed., 2002) (recounting that federal government’s legislative actions 
during the 1980s and 1990s were intended “to assist schools in providing a disciplined 
learning environment free of violence and drug use, including alcohol and tobacco”); 
RUSSELL J. SKIBA, IND. EDUC. POLICY CTR., ZERO TOLERANCE, ZERO EVIDENCE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES (2000), available at 
http://www.indiana.edu/~safeschl/ztze.pdf (“Growing out of Reagan-Bush era drug 
enforcement policy, zero tolerance discipline attempts to send a message by punishing 
both major and minor incidents severely.”). 
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incentives to states that follow federal suggestions for policing and punishing 
public school students.72   
As the “superpredator” myth spread across the country during the 1990s, 
federal efforts to police public school youth expanded.73  Troubled urban 
teens – mostly youth of color – were painted as a common threat that needed 
to be controlled and contained.74  In 1994 alone the legislature passed at least 
four new federal school safety laws, which created more grant programs to 
further entice states to ramp up anti-drug and school policing efforts.75  Alt-
hough many of these programs allowed funds to be used for “curriculum-
based” prevention and education programs, heightened security and aggres-
sive school discipline became touchstones of this era and mantras for those 
states seeking federal financial support.76  
The federal Safe Schools Act of 1994 declared in its statement of pur-
pose that “by the year 2000, every school in America will be free of drugs 
and violence and will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning, 
by ensuring that all schools are safe and free of violence.”77  The related Gun-
Free Schools Act of 1994 (GFSA) required states to punish any student found 
carrying a firearm to school with a presumptive one-year expulsion.78  Taken 
  
 72. Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1986, § 5101, Pub L. No. 100-
297, 102 Stat. 130 (1986); see also Laura Beresh-Taylor, Comment, Preventing Vio-
lence in Ohio’s Schools, 33 AKRON L. REV. 311, 315, n.23 (2000). 
 73. Moriearty & Carson, supra note 70, at 293-300 (recounting how the devel-
opment of the black “super-predator” teen evolved in the 1990s, largely through press 
accounts); see also Robin Templeton, Superscapegoating: Teen “Superpredators” 
Hype Set Stage for Draconian Legislation, FAIR: FAIRNESS & ACCURACY REPORTING 
(Jan. 1, 1998), http://fair.org/extra-online-articles/ superscapegoating (cataloging 
extreme press references to “teenage timebomb(s)” and “superpredators” that were 
based in part on the claims of Princeton professor John Dililio). 
 74. Moriearty & Carson, supra note 70, at 295-96 (recounting how press and 
other accounts painted youth of color as out of control, uncivilized, and wild).  See 
generally STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND THE 
MORAL PANIC OVER THE CITY (2006). 
 75. See Alexander Volokh, A Brief Guide to School-Violence Prevention, 2 J.L. 
& FAM. STUD. 99, 103 (2000) (noting that the Safe Schools Act, the Safe and Drug-
Free Schools and Communities Act, the Family Community Endeavor Schools Act, 
and the Community Schools Youth Services and Supervision Grant Programs were all 
passed in 1994 and provided money to qualifying states). 
 76. Id. at 104.  Notably, however, some jurisdictions and school districts began 
their own crackdown efforts even before federal financial incentives encouraged such 
actions.  For instance, California, New York and Kentucky were ahead of the federal 
curve in mandating lengthy expulsions for “violent” activity, such as fighting, as early 
as 1989.  SKIBA, supra note 71, at 2; see also UCLA INST. FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUC. & 
ACCESS, SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION AT-A-GLANCE 1 (2006), available at 
http://idea.gseis.ucla.edu/publications/files/suspension.pdf. 
 77. Safe Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 5961 (2006) (noting that this promise 
would help local schools achieve national education goals). 
 78. Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (2000) (repealed 2002).  
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together, this series of legislative actions further fueled a powerful, punitive 
movement across the country79 – one that ran alongside press accounts that 
perpetuated the “superpredator” myths and fears about young men of color.80  
Missouri initially resisted the tough-on-youth rhetoric.  By the time the 
federal government started moving forward with its various safe schools pro-
visions, Missouri lawmakers were already grappling with appropriate local 
solutions for student misconduct.81  No comprehensive legislation had been 
adopted, as competing approaches to the “safe schools” theme were debated 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  The discussions considered a range of op-
tions – from imposing severe sanctions on misbehaving youth to engaging in 
more preventative measures.82  And this conversation was, of course, taking 
place on the heels of the highly successful launch of DYS’s Missouri Model, 
which eschewed harsh, punitive treatment for youths.83  
Consistent with its attempts to achieve a middle ground, when the Mis-
souri General Assembly finally complied with the GFSA it did so in a less 
punitive way than many other states.84  It passed a law that required a pre-
sumptive one-year suspension for students found possessing weapons on 
school property, but created a case-by-case review process overseen by 
school superintendents and permitted long-term suspended students to con-
tinue to receive alternative educational services.85  It did not institute re-
quirements on the courts and corrections side of the ledger; that is, the law 
  
 79. Dennis Cauchon, Zero-Tolerance Policies Lack Flexibility, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 13, 1999, 12:33 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/educate/ednews3.htm (“Zero-
tolerance policies started sweeping the country in 1994 after Congress required states 
to adopt laws that guaranteed one-year expulsions for any student who brought a 
firearm to school.”); SKIBA, supra note 71, at 2 (“This tide swept zero tolerance into 
national policy when the Clinton Administration signed the Gun-Free Schools Act of 
1994 into law.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Judge Steven Teske, Judge Steven Testke on the Politics of Fear: 
Debunking the Superpredator Myth, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://jjie.org/judge-steven-teske-on-politics-of-fear-debunking-superpredator-
myth/12835 (arguing that the “superpredator myth,” preying on community fears, has 
helped fuel “tough on kids” law enforcement and legislative agendas). 
 81. See Deborah Peterson, Ashcroft Seeks Public Support for Safe-Schools Legis-
lation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1988, at 6A, available at 1988 WLNR 
318843 (describing Ashcroft’s proposed “Crime-Free Schools Program” which ulti-
mately was not passed). 
 82. L. Megan Humphries, School Violence Tops Education List, MO. DIGITAL 
NEWS (Dec. 14, 1995), http://www.mdn.org/1995/STORIES/EDADVAN.HTM. 
 83. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 84. See SKIBA, supra note 71, at 2; see also Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspend-
ing and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero 
Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1074 (2001). 
 85. See MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(5) (2000 & Supp. 2012); see also H.B. 345, 
88th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1995), available at http://www.house.mis-
souri.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills95/bills95/hb345.htm. 
15
Quinn: Quinn: Other Missouri Model
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Quinn – Final Formatting 3/9/14 Created on:  4/15/2014 1:02:00 PM Last Printed: 4/15/2014 1:23:00 PM 
1208 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
did not mandate that school officials report weapons violations to law en-
forcement as contemplated by federal law.86 
This all changed, however, in the wake of a tragic incident in the St. 
Louis area.  In January 1995, a fifteen-year-old McCluer North High School 
freshman was sexually assaulted and killed in the girls’ bathroom while out 
on a hall pass.87  Her attacker, a fifteen-year-old special education student 
with serious mental health issues, had transferred to the school just one day 
before, after he was suspended from another Missouri school.88  McCluer 
North officials did not know about his pending disciplinary sanction – which 
was allegedly imposed because he was found in the girls’ restroom at his 
prior school – or his prior juvenile arrest record.89  The youth was sentenced 
to life imprisonment for his actions.90      
Following this incident, the late Governor Mel Carnahan and the Mis-
souri General Assembly moved quickly to create a more expansive set of 
provisions to try to prevent similar incidents.91  In June 1996, Governor Car-
nahan signed into law the Missouri Safe Schools Act.92  One of the Act’s key 
  
 86. See MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(5); Mo. H.B. 345; see also 20 U.S.C. § 8922 
(2000) (repealed 2002). 
 87. William C. Lhotka, Taylor is Guilty of Rape, Murder – Teen Attacked, 
Drowned Girl in High School Restroom – Life in Prison Is the Only Option, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 1998, at A1, available at 1998 WLNR 940718.       
 88. William C. Lhotka, Trial Set in Slaying at School – Judge Finds Defendant 
Mentally Competent, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 9, 1997, at 1B, available at 
1997 WL 891907 [hereinafter Lhotka, Trial Set in Slaying]. 
 89. Tim O’Neil, Principal: “We Didn’t Know Anything About this Kid”, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 1995, at 13A, available at 1995 WLNR 731000; see 
also Tim O’Neil & Bill Lhotka, Jurors Are Selected in Killing at McCluer North – 
Girl Was Raped, Drowned in McCluer North Restroom, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Feb. 11, 1998, at B1, available at 1998 WLNR 946922. 
 90. Although the youth had been found competent to stand trial as an adult and 
receive a life sentence, he was later diagnosed as suffering from severe paranoid-
schizophrenia.  See Lhotka, Trial Set in Slaying, supra note 88; Chris Blank, Court 
Rejects 1 Death Sentence, Upholds Another, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 27, 2008, 
available at Westlaw.  He was ultimately convicted of strangling his prison cellmate, 
who he believed he had to send to “father” on the “dark side” and sentenced to death.  
Id.  Horrifically abused as a child by family members who tried to exorcise demons 
from him, the young man had tried to commit suicide at age ten.  Id.  He was granted 
a new sentencing in the second homicide matter because his lawyers failed to present 
sufficient evidence of his serious mental health problems.  Id.  
 91. Kim Bell, Schools Bill Rushed Through, Lawmakers Say, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 21, 1996, at 12A, available at 1996 WLNR 781291. 
 92. See Susan Anderson, The Safe Schools Act Protects Missouri Students, 55 J. 
MO. B. 264, 264 (1999); Stanley Matthew Burgess, Note, Missouri’s Safe Schools 
Act: An Attempt to Ensure a Safe Education Opportunity, 66 UMKC L. REV. 603, 603 
(1998); Cathi M. Kraetzer, Law Summary, Does the Missouri Safe Schools Act Pass 
the Test? Expelling Disruptive Students to Keep Missouri Schools Safe, 67 MO. L. 
REV. 123, 124 (2002). 
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features is enhanced information sharing among the state actors interested in 
youth.  Thus, like the draft of federal safe schools legislation passed two 
years before, the Missouri Safe Schools Act impacted two government units – 
both schools and courts – with the goal of bringing them closer together.   
Perhaps due to the strong emotional reaction to the tragic McCluer 
North incident, the Missouri Safe Schools Act’s provisions went far beyond 
what federal law required.93  Indeed, in some respects the Missouri Safe 
Schools Act is among the most expansive in the country.94  Its interconnected 
web of protective features linking juvenile court and school administrators 
has created an almost seamless network between the two systems, making it 
easier to label youths and push them from school into the courts and correc-
tions systems.95   
As for the juvenile court side of the ledger, the Missouri Safe Schools 
Act’s provisions threw open the gates to require courts and law enforcement 
officials to share a great deal of information with school officials in the name 
of “assuring that good order and discipline is maintained in the school.”96   
For instance, the Act mandates disclosure to school officials if and when a 
student is charged in juvenile court with any one of several crimes, ranging 
from first degree murder to property damage to simple weapon possession.97  
No matter the location of an alleged offense – on school grounds or elsewhere 
in the community – the juvenile court must report this information to     
school officials within five days of a petition being filed.98  Thus, even when 
  
 93. Bell, supra note 91.  
 94. Somewhat ironically, Missouri’s Safe School Act is remarkably progressive 
in one respect – its creation of an alternative school model for long-term suspended 
and expelled students.  However, as will be further discussed infra, some school  
districts have liberally accessed these alternatives.  They have moved perceived prob-
lem children out of traditional educational placements and into alternative school 
settings without first determining that sufficient evidence exists, following a full-
blown due process hearing, to support suspension or expulsion.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 95. Although the relationship between courts and schools is now seamless, the 
Safe Schools Act itself was hastily adopted and is near incomprehensible in parts, 
with some provisions seeming to conflict with others.  See Bell, supra note 91.  
 96. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.115(1)-(3) (2000). 
 97. Id. § 167.115(1).  The original version of the Act listed eighteen different 
alleged crimes subject to disclosure.  H.B. 1301 & 1298, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 1996).  In 2000, the Act was amended to add four sex-related crimes to the 
list schools would learn about.  S.B. 944, 90th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2000).  Now there are twenty-two offenses juvenile court officers or law enforcement 
officials are required to report to the superintendent of schools.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
167.115 (1). 
 98. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.115(1)-(2).  Pursuant to these sections of the Missouri 
Safe Schools Act there are twenty-two offenses ranging from property damage in the 
first degree to first degree murder that require the juvenile officer or law enforcement 
official to report to the superintendent of the school district when a petition has been 
filed alleging that a youth in her district has committed such an offense.  Id.  
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a child asserts his innocence, the school is provided “a complete description 
of the conduct the pupil is alleged to have committed and the dates the     
conduct occurred.”99 
Since the Act’s initial enactment, it has been amended to require further 
disclosures on the part of juvenile court officials to school officials.100  After 
disposition the court is required to provide the child’s school with access to 
the findings of facts in the matter – even if the child was found not guilty.101  
Although such information is provided to schools with the understanding that 
it is “received in confidence,” the information may be shared with any teacher 
or school district employee the superintendent believes has “a need to 
know.”102  This destroys the general cloak of confidentially that youths are 
promised in juvenile court, creating a class of court-involved students who 
have a scarlet letter for the rest of their academic careers.103 
Even worse, although this same set of provisions provides that “[t]his in-
formation shall not be used as the sole basis for not providing educational 
services to a public school pupil,”104 another part of the Act, codified in a 
different section of the law, empowers school officials to bar students from 
attending school if they are charged with any one of eleven delineated offens-
es.105  Thus a young person who merely has a petition filed against him for 
certain offenses – even if those offenses are alleged to have occurred nowhere 
near a school – may still face the collateral consequence of being removed 
from school in districts that read the provisions broadly.106  
  
 99. Id. § 167.115 (2). 
 100. MO. REV. STAT. §167.115(1)-(2) (2000) (previous version amended by S.B. 
944, 90th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000)). 
 101. Id. § 167.115(2). 
 102. Id. § 167.115 (3). 
 103. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.321 (2000 & Supp. 2012); see also Kristin 
Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and 
Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 526-30 (2004); 
RUSSELL SKIBA ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, 
ARE ZERO TOLERANCE POLICIES EFFECTIVE IN THE SCHOOLS? AN EVIDENTIARY 
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8-9 (2006) (discussing the stigmatization of youth 
identified as “at-risk of violence” and various studies by national law enforcement 
agencies which have found that is “impossible to construct reliable profiles that can 
be of assistance in promoting school safety”). 
 104. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.115(3).  Beyond this apparent inconsistency in the 
text, the numbering of this set of provisions adds to their incoherence. 
 105. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.171 (3) (2000 & Supp. 2012).  As originally enacted 
this part of the Act listed nine offenses that allowed for a child’s removal from school.  
H.B. 1301 & 1298, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996).  In 2004, the Act 
was amended to add two additional charged crimes precluding continued school at-
tendance – both were sex related offenses. S.B. 969, 92nd Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2004). 
 106. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.171(3).  Additionally in Missouri a youth who no 
longer is subject to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction either due to certification to adult 
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Missouri’s Safe Schools Act does provide that if a child is acquitted of 
the charges against him in juvenile court, or if the charges are dismissed, he 
may seek to be readmitted or reenrolled at school.107  However, the Act pro-
vides no guidance for such a process.  Moreover, in practice it appears that 
such readmission is not always sought.  Many children, families, and court 
personnel operate under the false assumption that a child may never be read-
mitted to his home school once charged with a “Safe Schools Act violation,” 
as these charges are often called.  And attempting to have such children ac-
cepted back into their home schools can amount to a Sisyphean task.108  
On the school side of the ledger, although the Missouri General Assem-
bly did not initially embrace the mandatory law enforcement requirements 
contemplated by the GFSA, it did so in passing the Missouri Safe Schools 
Act.109  And like some other states, Missouri has gone substantially further in 
its legislatively-required police reporting.  Thus, since its inception the Act 
has required school administrators to notify law enforcement not only for 
school-related gun offenses and various violent felonies, but also for other 
lesser weapons violations, drug possession, and even school fights.110  But in 
a series of amendments the list has been expanded to include other acts, such 
as alleged stalking, harassment, and drug and weapons possession not just at 
school but also at school-related activities.111   
There are well over thirty alleged acts requiring mandatory police inter-
vention for accused students.112  Admittedly, many of these are serious crimes 
for which law enforcement intervention might be expected.  But under the 
Act, Missouri students face the direct consequence of school discipline as 
  
court or aging out of the system can be removed from school if charged, admits to, or 
is found guilty of a felony in a “court of general jurisdiction.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
167.161(3) (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.171(3). 
 108. During our clinic’s first semesters of operation, our student attorneys report-
ed that this issue was one of the most frustrating and difficult tasks they encountered 
as attorneys for youths.  See infra Part III.B. 
 109. See MO. REV. STAT. § 167.117(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. 2012); see also H.B. 
1301 & 1298, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996). 
 110. See MO. REV. STAT. § 167.117 (guns, weapons, controlled substances, and 
assaults); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261 (2000 & Supp. 2012) (various violent felonies).  
Notably, the Missouri Safe Schools Act also created a new crime, “assault while on 
school property,” a class D felony.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.075 (2000).  Therefore, 
most school fights in Missouri now qualify as felonious conduct.  The Safe Schools 
Act does contemplate the possibility of school districts entering into agreements with 
local law enforcement for special reporting of third degree assaults.  It is unclear, 
however, what kind of agreements were considered or intended by this provision.  See 
MO. REV. STAT. § 167.117(1). 
 111. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 160.261, 167.117 (2000 & Supp. 2012); see also S.B. 
944, 90th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000). 
 112. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 160.261, 167.117. 
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well as the collateral consequences of arrest and prosecution.113  For many 
students this means a proceeding in the juvenile justice system.114  However, 
because the age of majority for criminal charges is seventeen in Missouri, 
many youths may find themselves answering a felony indictment in adult 
criminal court for a schoolyard scuffle.115   
The Missouri Safe Schools Act also requires that school administrators 
notify local juvenile courts of suspensions of ten days or more for any child 
who the district “is aware is under the jurisdiction of the court.”116  Under 
state and federal law, such educational information would ordinarily remain 
confidential and protected from disclosure absent the child’s consent.117  
Moreover, the suspension reporting requirement is not expressly limited to 
those students who have serious pending court matters, which are delineated 
in Missouri Revised Statutes section 167.115.118  Rather, some believe the 
Act allows school officials to contact juvenile courts with information about 
the suspension of any child they know to be court-involved in any way – even 
if the student is merely part of a diversion or informal adjustment program.  
It is easy to see how court officials may believe that school administra-
tors should be made aware of all students under the jurisdiction of the court – 
even those not charged with Safe Schools Act violations.119  And school offi-
cials may take it upon themselves to over report internal disciplinary matters 
to juvenile courts in an abundance of caution.  This reciprocal “open-file” 
relationship results in disclosure of what otherwise could not be shared, mak-
ing the schools an extension of the juvenile officer and vice versa.120  Here 
again, a perpetual cycle of back and forth reporting creates the impression 
that courts and schools are coextensive agents and joint actors in monitoring 
and penalizing students.121  With official records being shared back and forth, 
unofficial telephone calls taking place, and court officials showing up unin-
  
 113. See MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261. 
 114. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 115. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.041 (2000 & Supp. 2012). 
 116. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.115(4) (2000). 
 117. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 160.261(1), 210.150(1), 455.004 (2000 & Supp. 2012); 
see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2012). 
 118. See MO. REV. STAT. § 167.115(4). 
 119. In 2000 the Safe Schools Act was amended to offer a further set of reasons 
for liberally sharing school records with juvenile justice authorities.  See MO. REV. 
STAT. § 167.020(7) (2000 & Supp. 2012) (“School districts may report or disclose 
education records to law enforcement and juvenile justice authorities if the disclosure 
concerns law enforcement’s or juvenile justice authorities’ ability to effectively serve, 
prior to adjudication, the student whose records are released.  The officials and au-
thorities to whom such information is disclosed must comply with applicable re-
strictions set forth in 20 U.S.C. Section 1232g (b)(1)(E).”). 
 120. See MO. REV. STAT. § 167.020(7). 
 121. See id.  
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vited for school disciplinary hearings,122 the walls between the two entities 
have all but fallen away in Missouri.  As a result, some youths become target-
ed, stigmatized, and labeled as problems in both forums – even when they 
may not have done anything wrong, or their wrongdoing was merely ordinary 
childhood misbehavior. 
Indeed, extra-legislative safety activism can be seen in many of        
Missouri’s school district policies that were revamped following the passage 
of the Missouri Safe Schools Act.  For example, the Blue Springs School 
District – located in a suburb of Kansas City – has expanded the definition   
of prohibited weapons for disciplinary policies well beyond that provided    
by federal or state legislation.123  Its rules ban anything that could be seen     
as threatening, even toy guns.124  Under the school district’s policies, a stu-
dent found with any of the prohibited items may face a one-year expulsion 
and arrest.125  
3.  Other Net-Widening Practices 
In this environment, many schools have also engaged in aggressive    
policing activities in the name of actively enforcing both state laws             
and school district policies.126  A wide range of ordinary adolescent behav-
iors, now prohibited under expansive codes of student conduct, are routinely 
met with school discipline and punishment.127  In many ways these practices 
have turned schools into jail-like settings dominated by a culture of suspicion 
and surveillance. 
For instance, while considered controversial and unusual just thirty 
years ago,128 it is now commonplace for inner city students to pass through 
  
 122. This author was surprised to find that court-employed deputy juvenile offic-
ers sometimes appear at school disciplinary and individualized education plan (IEP) 
hearings in St. Louis County without an express invitation from the child or the fami-
ly or prior notice to them. 
 123. See Section 5 – Policies Relating to Students, BLUE SPRINGS SCH. DISTRICT, 
at 5-44, 5-45, http://www.bluesprings-schools.net/bluesprings/gen/blue_springs_ gen-
erated_bin/documents/basic_module/Section_5__Policies_Relating_to_Students. pdf 
[hereinafter Blue Springs Policy]. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. It should be noted that some Missouri schools are on the extreme opposite 
side of the spectrum, in that they fail to provide any kind of environment conducive to 
teaching and learning.  For instance, this author recently spoke with a teacher who 
fears for her safety and the safety of her students because of the extreme lack of disci-
pline and order in her unaccredited school district.   
 127. See Henning, supra note 103, at 610-11. 
 128. Joan Little & Phyllis Brasch Librach, Schools on Guard Against Violence; 
Metal Detectors, ID Cards, Bus Cameras Will Greet Area Students, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 1994, at 1A. 
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metal detectors and endure invasive searches of their persons and belongings 
before they attend their first class.129  Yet such practices have not been proven 
to increase school safety.130  Instead, these searches may work to foster re-
sentment and fear in students subjected to such ongoing indignities.131  
In addition to entering schools through search checkpoints, many stu-
dents must contend with aggressive uniformed officers who monitor school 
doors, sweep school halls, and even enter classrooms.  While some of these 
officers may be school employees, others are armed law enforcement officers 
brought in from the outside to police public schools.132  Working together, 
they perpetuate an “us against them” culture in schools.  For example, St. 
Louis-area youths have recounted feeling intimidated and oppressed by 
school staff and security officers.133  They report that they are treated like 
common criminals by school staff and police officers who work as part of a 
team, shouting orders at them in the halls and routinely imposing out-of-
school suspensions on the spot for simply answering back or swearing.134    
In addition, many Missouri schools routinely deploy drug-sniffing dogs 
to search students and their lockers, school bags, and books on a regular ba-
sis.  While some searches involve dogs walking the hallways to sniff lockers 
while students are in class, others involve forced evacuation of classrooms so 
that the dogs can riffle through the belongings that students leave behind.  In 
fact, such practices were recently challenged before the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals by parents of a Springfield, Missouri high school student.135  The 
panel upheld the search under the Fourth Amendment.136  Despite these ongo-
ing objections and concerns that such practices make all students feel like 
  
 129. For instance, while St. Louis City middle and high schools have their stu-
dents enter through metal detectors, nearby suburban Kirkwood High School does 
not.  See Nancy Fowler, Local Schools Have Parent Alerts, Security Measures in 
Place, BEACON (Dec. 14, 2012, 4:01 PM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/ 
28485/connecticut_shooting_reactions.  
 130. Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz & Thomas Simon, Impacts of Metal Detector 
Use in Schools: Insights from 15 Years of Research, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 100, 105 
(2011), available at http://www.edweek.org/media/hankin-02security.pdf.  
 131. Id. at 104-05. 
 132. Mark Slavit, Police Visit Columbia Schools Daily to Stop Violence, 
CONNECT MID-MO. (Jan. 17, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.connectmidmissouri. 
com/news/story.aspx?id=849190. 
 133. Quinn, supra note 57, at 557. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Burlison v. Springfield Pub. Sch., 708 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 136. Id. at 1041; see also Appeals Court Upholds Use of Drug-Detection Dogs by 
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suspects,137 other Missouri school districts are expanding the use of suspi-
cionless dog searches to their schools.138  All of this effort, of course, is in  
the name of rooting out potential drugs that may be hidden in student be-
longings – not enhancing educational services. 
Charles E. McCrary, Sr., the former Chief of Security for St. Louis Pub-
lic Schools who still uses the title “Lieutenant Colonel,” describes many of 
these practices in his self-published book, Urban School Security from Be-
hind the Scenes.139  While his honest account reflects deep care for the well-
being of St. Louis Public Schools, his methods suggest far less concern for 
the dignity, privacy, and education rights of at-risk students.140  Such attitudes 
unfortunately appear to remain a part of the culture in many St. Louis Public 
Schools, which have an almost entirely African-American student body.141   
In fact, large numbers of minority youth are pushed out of Missouri’s 
schools each year in both direct and indirect ways.142  One recent develop-
ment involves the “creative” use of unilateral transfers.  Such practices move 
supposed problem students out of the regular school setting into alternative 
  
 137. Lisa Sullivan, Drug-Sniffing Dogs in Schools Make Every Student a Suspect, 
ACLU WASH. ST. (June 6, 2011), http://aclu-wa.org/blog/drug-sniffing-dogs-schools-
make-every-student-suspect. 
 138. See, e.g., Kirkwood High Considers Drug-Sniffing Dogs, CBS ST. LOUIS 
(April 23, 2013, 7:34 AM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2013/04/23/kirkwood-high-
considers-using-drug-sniffing-dogs/; Carol Enright, Drug Search: Parkway to Use 
Drug Sniffing Dogs, NEWSMAGAZINE NETWORK (Nov. 26, 2012, 1:13 PM), 
http://www.newsmagazinenetwork.com/2012112627851/drug-search-parkway-to-
use-drug-sniffing-dogs/ (during drug dog searches middle and high school “students 
will remain in the classrooms during an intruder lockdown drill”). 
 139. Quinn, supra note 57, at 558; LT. COL. CHARLES E. MCCRARY, SR., URBAN 
SCHOOL SECURITY FROM BEHIND THE SCENES: VIEWS FROM A RETIRED URBAN 
SCHOOL SECURITY DIRECTOR 59-78 (2007).  McCrary currently heads up “McCrary 
Security Consultants, Inc.: Home of the B.O.S.S. Force,” which claims to specialize 
in “research and development of Successful Urban School Security Operations” and 
teach the “B.O.S.S. Force” approaches he claims to have successfully deployed in St. 
Louis.  About the Firm, MCCRARY SECURITY CONSULTANTS, INC., http://www. boss-
force1.com/about_firm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 140. Quinn, supra note 57, at 558; see also, e.g., MCCRARY, supra note 139,       
at xiv (recounting an “unannounced locker search” for narcotics, undertaken             
by school administrators and police officers together); id. at 11-12 (describing collab-
oration with city police to help collect evidence against students that ordinary         
law enforcement could not, and then sharing such information for use in juvenile 
court prosecutions). 
 141. See Norwood, supra note 51, at 58.   
 142. Discipline of Students Without Disabilities: More Than One Out-of-School 
Suspensions, DEPT. OF ED. CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, http://ocrdata. 
ed.gov/Page?t=d&eid=28024&syk=5&pid=564 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013);         
LEA Summary of Selected Facts, DEPT. OF ED. CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION, 
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Page?t=d&eid=28024&syk=5&pid=119 (last visited Nov.       
15, 2013). 
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school placements for long periods of time.143  For instance, rather than 
providing alternative education to already long-term suspended or expelled 
students who were afforded due process proceedings – as contemplated under 
the Missouri Safe Schools Act144 – in some instances schools have skipped 
full evidentiary due process hearings to simply transfer youth after an infor-
mal conference with the child and his or her parents.145   
Despite substantial financial support for these alternative programs,146 
many of these alternative schools provide just a few short hours of education-
al services each day.147  Some do so by way of simplistic self-taught comput-
erized lessons covering basic topics.148  And nearly all of these programs fail 
to provide gym classes, team sports, or other ordinary school activities that 
could benefit at-risk youth.149  Thus, while St. Louis Public Schools may not 
be reporting such transfers to alternative programs as long-term suspensions 
or expulsions, some youth advocates, students, and families believe they are 
tantamount to such actions.150   
  
 143. See Jane Coaston, Suit Sheds Some Light on Makeup Work, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (March 9, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/edu-
cation/suit-sheds-some-light-on-makeup-work/article_89227588-81b9-5d79-8954-
85a74b0a992f.html; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975) (requiring 
due process protections before a child’s property and liberty interests in education can 
be infringed). 
 144. See 1301 & 1298, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996); see also 
MO. CONST., art. IX, § 1(a). 
 145. See Jane Coaston, Transferred Students, District Settle: St. Louis Public 
Schools Will Clear Records of Suspension, but Students Cannot Immediately Return 
to Soldan, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.stltoday. 
com/news/local/education/article_a0d11e48-f3fe-5deb-81f0-66ed9172b7e3.html. 
 146. See Burgess, supra note 92, at 625 (citing to the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives Interim Committee Report on Safe Schools and Alternative Education 
(1995)); 1301 & 1298, 88th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1996) (for further 
legislative history of the Safe Schools Act and its creation of alternative school sys-
tems, intended for suspended and expelled youth). 
 147. See Coaston, supra note 145. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. During one such proceeding during the 2012-13 school year, the convening 
school official repeatedly referred to her decision as required under the District’s 
“zero tolerance” policies.  But she also claimed the unilateral transfer over objection 
was not a suspension or expulsion.  In addition, when it was pointed out that the Dis-
trict recently adopted policies that required the use of least restrictive means and posi-
tive behavioral supports prior to harsh discipline action, she appeared completely 
unaware of this change.  She requested that our clinic’s student attorneys share with 
her the policies that we brought to the meeting.  See ST. LOUIS PUB. SCH. DIST., 2013-
2014 PARENT INFORMATION GUIDE AND STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT, available at 
http://www.slps.org/cms/lib03/MO01001157/Centricity/Domain/70/CodeofConductH
andbook1314.pdf [hereinafter PARENT INFORMA-TION GUIDE].  Fortunately, in one 
more recent hearing in which JLJC participated, the process was greatly improved.  In 
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Interestingly, in St. Louis City such transfers are never accompanied by 
the assignment of what can only be described as a probation officer.151  These 
officers inform unilaterally-transferred students that they will be routinely 
visited at their new alternative school setting and monitored for continued 
good behavior.  This officer is also the person who will ultimately make a 
determination as to whether the child is ready to return to his or her home 
school.  During this process there are other conditions that need to be satisfied 
by the child before they can seek permission to reapply to attend their regular 
school.  Yet such probationary monitoring and review is not expressly de-
scribed in any St. Louis City School District Policy.152   
Other school districts more officially make such practices known to the 
public. For instance, Blue Springs School District policies provide that stu-
dents may be required to satisfy conditions prior to their return.153  They may 
be asked to demonstrate that they have “maintained a drug and alcohol free 
lifestyle for the duration of their absence,”154 “had no arrests or charges 
brought against them by any law enforcement agency,”155 and/or had “been in 
drug or alcohol rehabilitation.”156  Thus, consistent with the theme of the 
Missouri Safe Schools Act – where schools and courts appear to have become 
one entity – educators take on a continuing supervisory and surveillance role 
of student activity outside the schoolhouse doors, a job usually held by law 
enforcement personnel, probation officers, and judges.157   
While no lawsuit has been brought to challenge these ancillary condi-
tions of return, the requirements appear to violate the constitutional dictates 
of Goss v. Lopez, which requires a due process hearing before the imposition 
of school discipline.158  What is more, the ever-more capricious nature of 
school disciplinary practices in Missouri recently inspired the creation of a 
lampooning cartoon video that was posted on YouTube last year and has 
  
addition, it appears computer-based alternative placements are now being replaced by 
improved alternative education services. 
 151. During our last experience with the school district we were informed this 
person’s official title is “Transition Specialist.”   
 152. See PARENT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 150. 
 153. Blue Springs Policy, supra note 123, at 5-40. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 5-41. 
 157. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.171 (2000 & Supp. 2012).   
 158. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).  This kind of ongoing and extended supervisory 
scheme that visits a burden on children to prove that they are worthy of continuing 
their education was never contemplated under the due process hearing procedures set 
out in Goss v. Lopez.  See id.  And it may be even more unlawful under Missouri’s 
more expansive Constitutional provisions, which provide children with a fundamental 
right to education.  See MO. CONST., art. IX, § 1(a). 
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since garnered thousands of views.159  It depicts incompetent school adminis-
trators who make up evidence against a student and impose arbitrary sanc-
tions for a fight that never happened.160 
B.  Juvenile Courts and Due Process Failures 
Although the cartoon described above makes light of a serious situation, 
the failure of Missouri’s public school systems is no laughing matter.  Nor are 
the related problems that plague the state’s juvenile courts.  Despite DYS 
serving as a model for the country, Missouri’s juvenile courts, the Juvenile 
Code under which they operate, and the practices that persist in Missouri’s 
anachronistic juvenile court culture are long outdated, unlawful, and in need 
of change.  This is yet another part of the Missouri Model that has largely 
escaped national attention – at least until now.161 
1.  Conflicts in Court Structure 
Indeed, as described by my colleague Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan in his 
important symposium article, Where the Judiciary Prosecutes in Front of 
Itself: Missouri’s Unconstitutional Juvenile Court Structure, Missouri’s juve-
nile courts are inherently conflicted in their structure.162  Professor Gupta-
Kagan accurately and compellingly explains that Missouri juvenile court 
judges are directly and indirectly involved in the charging, processing, prose-
cuting, adjudicating, and sentencing of Missouri’s youth.163  Not only does 
the arrangement present professional conflicts of interest, it is very likely 
unconstitutional for a number of reasons. 
Juvenile officers,164 who serve in a range of roles including probation 
officers and the prosecutors who represent those officers (known as attorneys 
for the juvenile officers),165 are all considered part of the judge’s own staff.  
While these actors may state that their day-to-day work is quite separate, 
there is no official requirement for – or check on – maintaining this separa-
tion.  At the end of the day, Missouri juvenile court judges have the power to 
hire and fire the very people who bring cases in front of them – the attorneys 
  
 159. SpecialEducationMo, Missouri School Discipline, YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 
2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p780VeA-_Zo. 
 160. Id.  
 161. See supra note 1. 
 162. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Where the Judiciary Prosecutes in Front of Itself: Mis-
souri’s Unconstitutional Juvenile Court Structure, 78 MO. L. REV. 1245 (2013). 
 163. Id. at 1264-66. 
 164. Id. at 1249 n.31 (describing the role and legal status of the juvenile officer). 
 165. Id. at 1251 n.45 and accompanying text (describing the role of attorneys for 
the juvenile officer and their legal status). 
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for the juvenile officers – and those who are repeat parties – the juvenile of-
ficers themselves.166   
While Professor Gupta-Kagan’s groundbreaking work primarily focuses 
on how such an ethically-challenged system impacts child abuse and neglect 
cases, I will focus on the implications for children facing prosecution in such 
courts.  The consequences of the court’s conflicted structure and its related 
unconstitutional practices are similarly troubling when young people face 
losing their liberty at the hands of these state actors.  As will be described 
below, these problems manifest themselves in three different ways in Mis-
souri juvenile prosecutions: through the roles of the judge, the juvenile of-
ficer, and the attorney for the juvenile officer.  
First, as a well-settled constitutional matter, the judiciary may not serve 
both as the investigating or prosecuting agent and as the fact finder.167  The 
Supreme Court of the United States has long held that serving in such dual 
roles violates due process norms of impartiality,168 as well as separation of 
powers principles that require prosecutorial and judicial roles to be distinct.169  
When a judge wears both hats in issuing or upholding warrants she may also 
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a defendant.170  This is why judges 
are not permitted to personally gather evidence that they plan to consider in 
  
 166. See id.  
 167. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[N]o man can be a judge in his 
own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the out-
come.  That interest cannot be defined with precision.  Circumstances and relation-
ships must be considered.”). 
 168. Id. at 141 (finding due process violation based on personal bias of judge and 
his involvement in prior related proceedings); Tume v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 
(1927) (violation of due process for judicial officer to have a “direct, personal, sub-
stantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against” the defendant in a case).  
 169. Town of New Town v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 296 (1987) (“Our de-    
cisions  . . . uniformly have recognized that courts normally must defer to prosecutori-
al decisions as to whom to prosecute . . . [b]ecause these decisions ‘are not readily 
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake,’ we have 
been ‘properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.’”); see also 
U.S. v. Doe, 125 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1997) (“separation of powers mandates 
judicial respect for the prosecutor’s independence”) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model De-
claratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 496 (1988) (“Prosecution typically is 
an executive branch function, and allowing a judge the power of appointment, remov-
al, or supervision over prosecutors threatens to diminish exclusively executive powers 
and augment the constitutionally limited role of judicial authority.”). 
 170. Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 328 (1979) (finding Fourth Amend-
ment violation where judicial officer played role in investigation and granted search 
warranted); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (“the 
seizure and search . . . [could not] constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the 
state official who was the chief investigator and prosecutor in [the] case”). 
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any matter, and in fact should seek to recuse themselves whenever there may 
be a doubt as to their impartiality in any case.171 
Yet, this is exactly what occurs in Missouri’s juvenile courts.  From the 
court’s approval of delinquency petitions that result in the temporary deten-
tion of youth, to issuing determinations at detention hearings for continued 
pretrial restraint of such young people, to rendering a final decision of guilt or 
innocence based on the evidence presented at an adjudication, Missouri’s 
juvenile judges are making determinations about facts that were gathered and 
presented by their own staffs. 
Judges may suggest that they are able to disregard the fact that those 
who prosecute cases before them are their very own employees.  But at some 
point any good-faith presumption of impartiality must give way to the ap-
pearance of impropriety, the realities of juvenile court practices around the 
state, and common sense.172   
In the experience of our JLJC clinic, legal officers have stated that they 
cannot take certain actions – such as modifying the charges in the petition for 
purposes of resolving a case – because the presiding judge would not agree to 
such an action.173  It is also a matter of common knowledge that both the legal 
officers and deputy juvenile officers frequently engage in ex parte conversa-
tions with juvenile judges while defense attorneys and their clients are not 
present.174  It might be suggested that such conversations simply expedite 
matters and do not result in any harm to the youth.  However, these practices 
all contribute to the inherent bias towards court staff and against others who 
  
 171. See, e.g., MO. S. CT. RULE 2-2.3 (“judge shall perform duties of office with-
out bias or prejudice”); MO. S. CT. RULE 2-2.11 (“The judge . . . served in governmen-
tal employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a . . . 
public official concerning the proceeding. . . .”); see also State v. Edman, 915 A.2d 
857, 867 (Conn. 2007) (“even though a judge personally believes himself to be un-
prejudiced, unbiased and impartial, he should nevertheless certify his disqualification 
where there are circumstances of such a nature to cause doubt as to his partiality, bias 
or prejudice”) (citing Merritt v. Hunter, 575 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla. 1978)). 
 172. State v. Whitfield, 939 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (“A judge 
should only be disqualified if a reasonable person, giving due regard to the presump-
tion of honesty and integrity, would find an appearance of impropriety and doubt the 
impartiality of the court.”). 
 173. In one particular case, where substantial Fourth Amendment and other legal 
issues undermined the prosecution’s case, the attorney for the juvenile officer indicat-
ed that she could not reduce the weapon charge against our client to the crime of pos-
session of ammunition because the judge would be upset with her.  We ultimately 
prevailed in having the case dismissed at a suppression hearing.  Yet one of the police 
officers who testified in the case warned our client in the hallway – after the judge 
ruled in our favor – that he knew where our client lived. 
 174. This assertion is based on not only my own personal experience and experi-
ences of my students, but confirmed by numerous conversations I have had with nu-
merous juvenile defender colleagues in Missouri. 
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are not on the court’s own “team.”  In addition, they create an insider’s prac-
tice that is resistant to emerging best practices or new arguments.   
As further evidence of this phenomenon, formal written motions and 
other zealous work of JLJC students repeatedly have been met with the fol-
lowing response: “That is not the way we do things here.”  In an extreme 
example, both my students and I were shouted at publically by a legal officer 
after we filed a petition to challenge ongoing policies of the court and a mo-
tion for reconsideration in a case the attorney was handling.175  While these 
examples reflect the actions of individual actors in individual situations,   
they – and those that follow – demonstrate the inherent dangers of Missouri’s 
current system, which allows judges, prosecutors, and probation staff to think 
of themselves as one team.  
As noted, the amorphous role of the juvenile officer presents a second 
serious problem for the current court model.  Again, such individuals are 
roughly equivalent to the probation officers that exist in juvenile courts 
around the country, but are also different given the many hats that they wear.  
The juvenile officers are referred to as the clients of the prosecutor; however, 
they can also serve as members of the prosecutor’s investigative staff who 
assist in gathering information for use during the prosecution, law enforce-
ment agents who effectuate arrests of youth, and, finally, as alleged advocates 
for the same youth.   
For example, juvenile officers serve as intake screeners at the front end 
of a case to determine if charges should be brought.176  Legal officers        
then oversee this assessment by reviewing and filing the delinquency peti-
tions.  But when a child is brought to court to answer for those charges, lines 
become blurred.  Youths are informed both that the legal officer is the      
attorney for the juvenile officer – that is, that the juvenile officer is in essence 
the plaintiff bringing the suit against the child – and that the juvenile officer 
will be making recommendations to the court about pretrial detention and 
disposition at the end of the case.  In this way, the juvenile officer serves as a 
double agent – he is both a represented opposing party in litigation, as well as 
the individual with whom the child and family is expected to share infor-
mation that will be considered by the officer suggesting release or detention 
for the child.177   
  
 175. Specifically, in this instance, my students were admonished by the juvenile 
prosecutor, “you don’t piss where you eat.” 
 176. Delinquency and Clinical Services: Telephone List, FAM. CT. ST. LOUIS 
COUNTY (May 2013) (on file with author) (listing deputy juvenile officers who serve 
in intake roles). 
 177. The recent case of In re M.M. paints a vivid picture of how the deputy juve-
nile officer may wear many hats – visiting with the child and family at home, collect-
ing information, providing informal legal advice, and then making recommendations 
for detention and disposition.  320 S.W.3d 191, 192-94 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010).  In 
M.M., the Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals allowed an unrepresented child 
to withdraw her plea when it seemed involuntary, in part because the DJO offered to 
 
29
Quinn: Quinn: Other Missouri Model
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: Quinn – Final Formatting 3/9/14 Created on:  4/15/2014 1:02:00 PM Last Printed: 4/15/2014 1:23:00 PM 
1222 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
More than this, juvenile officers frequently suggest to young people that 
they are there to “advocate” for the child, creating further confusion in the 
minds of the children and family members who encounter these officers.178  
Indeed, in several of the cases the JLJC clinic has handled, after the juvenile 
officer interviewed the child upon his arrest, family members were left with 
the distinct impression that the officer was, in fact, the child’s defense attor-
ney.  This can be attributed to the fact that in St. Louis County, as in other 
counties, juvenile officers often conduct interviews with the children well 
before an attorney is provided.179  In addition, some courts actually provide 
juvenile officers with the title “youth advocate,” adding to the confusion.180  
Either way, many children and family members become upset when these 
same officers – who were originally believed to be advocates of the youth – 
turn on the child, use information shared by the family against him or her, and 
recommend a child’s detention or placement.   
Because the juvenile officer is, at times, treated like a represented party, 
this creates another problematic situation for defense attorneys seeking to 
effectively represent their clients.  Some legal officers allow defense counsel 
to freely talk about pending cases with juvenile officers.  Other legal officers 
claim that defense attorneys may not speak with juvenile officers without 
either their express permission or the presence of a prosecutor, treating the 
juvenile officer like a privately-represented litigant.181  However, the juvenile 
  
change her recommendation from detention to release if the child pleaded guilty and 
was placed on probation.  Id. at 195-97.   
 178. Delinquency and Clinical Services: Telephone List, supra note 176 (listing 
several deputy juvenile officers with title as “youth advocate”).  In some cases, in-
cluding ones handled by JLJC, families have been led to believe they should not seek 
representation as it will merely hurt the child by resulting in detention prior to dispo-
sition or otherwise slow down the case.  See, e.g., In re M.M., 320 S.W.3d 191.  Simi-
larly, several clients and their parents have now reported to JLJC that juvenile officers 
and other service providers affiliated with the juvenile courts have directly advised 
them against using JLJC’s services, claiming the clinic’s zealous defense work could 
negatively impact the child. 
 179. In fact, in our experience written reports with the recommendations of the 
juvenile officer are frequently finalized well before a defense attorney is able to inter-
view the child or informally advocate with the juvenile officer or her attorney relating 
to release status. 
 180. Delinquency and Clinical Services: Telephone List, supra note 176.  In our 
experience, assigned DJOs also visit accused youth in the detention center at least 
once a week prior to trial, engaging the youth in all manner of conversation, despite 
our written submissions invoking the child’s right to silence and presence of counsel 
during questioning.    
 181. See MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-4.2 (2007) (“In representing a 
client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with     
a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless 
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a 
court order.”). 
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officer is a government agent like any other law enforcement officer; there-
fore, he or she should be accessible to defense counsel for investigative inter-
views.182  When such contacts are precluded as a matter of prosecutorial poli-
cy it skews the playing field even more against the accused child and in favor 
of the juvenile court team.  
Yet the legal officers may still deploy the juvenile officer – again, a 
government actor – to gather evidence directly from the child as opposing 
party.  They may then also claim that a child’s failure to speak with the juve-
nile officer reflects a lack of cooperation on the part of the child that should 
be used against them.183  All of this seems even more procedurally perverse 
when considering that all of these people are actually employees of the judge 
who will hear and decide the case; in other words, such power plays are tak-
ing place with the express or implied consent of the court. 
The above dynamic also points to the third problem created by the 
court’s structure: the manifold ethical challenges facing legal officers.  These 
officers must operate in such conflicted systems while still trying to fulfill 
their ordinary professional responsibilities as attorneys, as well as their spe-
cial duties as prosecutors.  On one hand, attorneys generally must take care to 
represent their clients free of any conflicts that would impede their ability to 
achieve the client’s objectives.184  This includes restrictions on accepting 
  
 182. See MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-4.2, cmt.5 (2007) (“Communica-
tions authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client 
who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the gov-
ernment.  Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities 
of lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative 
agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings.”).  
In most situations, a juvenile officer would be free to decline an interview – but as a 
matter of due process should not be silenced by prosecutors.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Cook, 
608 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979) (“As a general rule, a witness belongs neither to 
the government nor to the defense.  Both sides have the right to interview witnesses 
before trial.  Exceptions to this rule are justifiable only under the ‘clearest and most 
compelling circumstances.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also U.S. v. Carrigan, 
804 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1986). 
 183. There are, of course, additional potential problems relating to Miranda viola-
tions, involuntary self-incrimination, and the formal and informal use of the infor-
mation obtained during these screening interviews.  These problems are seldom raised 
or addressed.  But at least one court recently took the system to task for allowing 
juvenile officers to conduct detention center interviews while alsoactng as youth ad-
vocates.  State v. Bustamonte, No. 09AC-CR03516 (Cir. Ct. Cole Cty. June 21, 2011) 
(order suppressing evidence), available at http://www.connectmidmissouri. 
com/uploadedFiles/krcg/News/Stories/Order%20to%20Suppress%20revised.pdf. 
 184. MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.7 cmt.8 (2013) (“Even where there is 
no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a 
lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action 
for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibili-
ties or interests.”). 
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payment from one place for purposes of representing a third party,185 and 
restrictions on disclosure of professional relationships that may impact the 
client.186  But in Missouri juvenile courts, legal officers necessarily have a 
duty to their employer – the court.  However, this is not openly addressed in 
any meaningful way during the course of litigation.  Moreover, legal officers 
are arguably receiving compensation from the court system for their represen-
tation of third party clients – juvenile officers – in a manner that raises serious 
questions.  On the other hand, prosecutors have special duties beyond those of 
ordinary counsel.  And regardless of what they are called – legal officers or 
attorneys for the juvenile officer – such individuals are juvenile court prose-
cutors.  Therefore, like other prosecutors, their primary ethical obligation is to 
seek justice.187  They may not simply pursue convictions or seek to achieve 
particular outcomes to satisfy individual persons.188  Therefore, claiming that 
they represent the interests or objectives of juvenile officers above all else 
would appear to conflict with their express ethical duties to the public.189   
But this, too, happens on a regular basis in Missouri’s juvenile courts; 
that is, legal officers take positions to advance the desires of the juvenile of-
ficers, rather than to single-mindedly seek justice.190  Indeed, on more than 
one occasion the JLJC clinic has been expressly told that legal officers may 
not advance certain arguments or reduce charges for purposes of a plea offer 
because it conflicts with the wishes of their clients, the deputy juvenile offic-
ers.191  This position is especially problematic when one considers that juve-
nile officers generally are not attorneys.192  Indeed, in June 2013 the Missouri 
Supreme Court issued a rule prohibiting such individuals from engaging in 
  
 185. MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.7 cmt.13 (2013) (describing limits on 
representation for individual when attorney’s salary is paid by a third party).  
 186. MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.7 cmt.10 (2013) (outlining conflicts 
that can arise out of employment relationships). 
 187. MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8 cmt.1 (2013) (“A prosecutor has 
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Of course one might take issue with amorphous parameters like “seek[ing] 
justice.”  But this standard has been long applied and respected by prosecutors across 
the country.  See, e.g., ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards: Prosecution Func-
tion, Standard 3-1.2 (c) (1992), available at: http://www.americanbar.org/publica-
tions/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_blk.html#1.2, (“The 
duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict”).  And whatever it 
might mean, it certainly is not defined by the aims of a singular client who is neither a 
victim of the alleged crime or an objective representative of the public. 
 191. In at least one case the legal officer sent a fax, reducing to writing her posi-
tion that the juvenile officer’s wishes needed to be respected and, therefore, she could 
not reduce the charge to avoid a certification hearing (Fax on file with author).  
 192. Instead they have a bachelor’s degree in sociology or a related field, or four 
years of prior related experience.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.361 (2000). 
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the unauthorized practice of law.193  Therefore, allowing them to indirectly 
exert control in individual cases runs a great risk of misconduct and inappro-
priate abdication of the prosecutorial role.194 
Untangling these conflicting roles may be even more complicated in 
counties where the juvenile officer, while an employee of the judge, is actual-
ly considered the superior or supervisor of the legal officer.  One example of 
such a structure can be seen in St. Louis County (see Diagram A195).  Howev-
er, as Professor Gupta-Kagan persuasively argues, regardless of whether the 
juvenile officer and his attorneys are co-equals under the judge or whether 
one supervises the other, the Missouri juvenile court structure presents a pic-
ture of conflict and unconstitutionality from top to bottom.196  
2.  Lack of Probable Cause Hearings 
The structural issues presented above are exacerbated by Missouri’s 
outdated, confusing, and conflicting juvenile court statutes and rules.        
Two main bodies of law control juvenile practice in Missouri: the Juvenile 
Code, codified at Chapter 211 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, and the Rules 
of Practice and Procedure in Juvenile Courts (Juvenile Court Rules).197        
As will be further discussed below, while the Juvenile Court Rules were re-
cently rewritten and reorganized, the principles underlying the provisions still 
reflect an outmoded approach to juvenile justice.  Moreover, in many ways 
the Juvenile Court Rules conflict with or undercut the statutory provisions 
found in the Juvenile Code.  And the Juvenile Code, which has been modified 
in a piecemeal fashion over the course of many decades, is a confusing     
morass of provisions that fails to provide a clear and coherent picture of    
how cases should unfold in Missouri’s courts.  Finally, components of both 
bodies of law and the manner in which they are interpreted present serious 
constitutional questions. 
One of the most problematic areas of Missouri juvenile law relates to 
detention hearings.  In 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
  
 193. 2013 MO. SUP. CT. ORDER 0006 (C.O. 0006).  Somewhat remarkably this 
rule does not go into effect until January 2014.  
 194. Whether it is seen as improperly giving over responsibilities to a third person 
or ceding power to a member of their own prosecutorial team, the legal officer should 
be held responsible for actions that lead to improper collection of evidence or the 
prosecution of unsupported charges.  See, e.g., MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-
3.8 cmt.6 (2013) (“Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rules 4-5.1 and 4-
5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for 
or are associated with the lawyer’s office.”); see also In re M.C., 504 S.W.2d 641, 
647 (Mo. App. 1974) (“The juvenile officer is not a prosecutor and if he functions as 
such he is striking at the very foundations of the juvenile justice system.”). 
      195.  See Diagram A infra note 316. 
 196. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 162 at 1261-69. 
 197. MO. REV. STAT., Ch. 211 (2000); MO. SUP. CT. R. PT. 1.  
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Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of Missouri’s juvenile detention processes, 
seeking to disrupt a history of informality in the state’s juvenile courts and 
impose greater protections for youth.198  In R.W.T. v. Dalton, the court was 
presented with the specific question of whether the “practice of detaining 
juveniles without affording them a preliminary hearing before a neutral and 
detached judicial officer to determine whether there was probable cause to 
believe that the juveniles had committed the acts with which they were 
charged” violated their constitutional rights.199   
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in 
Gerstein v. Pugh,200 the Eighth Circuit held: “We agree with the District 
Court that juveniles who are detained because they are suspected of commit-
ting criminal acts must be afforded a prompt probable-cause hearing.”201  The 
court explained that “[a]lthough Pugh involved only the right of adults to a 
probable-cause hearing, we believe that the right must be extended to juve-
niles as well.”202  And after criticizing the widespread practice of behind-
closed-doors, ex parte communications to support detention determinations 
for Missouri juveniles, the court upheld an injunction “forbidding all such 
unlawful detention in the future.”203 
But remarkably, thirty years later these constitutional directives still are 
not codified in Missouri’s Juvenile Code.204  Instead, the Juvenile Code ex-
pressly provides for probable cause-based detention hearings for status of-
fense cases only.205  And the Juvenile Court Rules relating to detention hear-
ings, although rewritten just two years ago, also fail to mention hearings that 
allow for in-court probable cause inquiries.206  Juvenile courts and their staffs 
also continue to overlook this essential due process requirement – despite 
R.W.T.’s injunction, which has now been in place for three decades.207  
  
 198. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d. 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1983).     
 199. Id. at 1228. 
 200. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
 201. R.W.T., 712 F.2d. at 1230. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1234. 
 204. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.061 (2012) (describing detention hearing process-
es for delinquency charges, suggesting that “a determination by the court that proba-
ble cause exists” may take place before the hearing). 
 205. See MO REV. STAT. § 211.063 (2000) (describing detention hearing processes 
for status offense charges, which includes a “probable cause hearing”); see also 
R.W.T., 712 F.2d at 1235 (“the District Court’s declaration that probable-cause hear-
ings are required, both for juveniles accused of criminal acts and for ‘status offenders’ 
as we have used that term in this opinion, is affirmed”). 
 206. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 127.08. 
 207. When the JLJC students sought to challenge probable cause determinations 
at the detention hearing stage, they were generally met with surprise by system actors 
who seemed never to have heard of R.W.T. before.  Again, it was suggested that the 
students’ ideas of fairness were simply out of step with how things were done in the 
St. Louis County Juvenile Court.  Similarly, in a recent St. Louis City Juvenile Court 
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Missouri’s statutory disregard for meaningful probable cause determina-
tions at the detention hearing stage is exacerbated by its failure to require 
probable cause determinations at the juvenile certification stage.  Under the 
Juvenile Code, the court may consider, among other things, ten specific   
criteria when deciding whether a child should remain in juvenile court or 
have their case transferred to adult criminal court.208  Like many other    
states, Missouri derives its criteria primarily from the landmark Supreme 
Court of the United States case Kent v. United States.209  Along with setting 
forth certain due process requirements relating to transfer hearings, the Court 
included as an appendix the list of criteria established in the District of Co-
lumbia after Kent’s case was handled.210  This list of factors became a model 
adopted around the country.211  
However, rather than adopting all of Kent’s factors like most states, 
Missouri decided to adopt all but one of the factors – the factor that required a 
showing of “prosecutive merit” for the crimes charged.212  Therefore, under 
current practices in many of Missouri’s juvenile courts, a teen’s case may be 
transferred to adult criminal court without the prosecutor ever presenting 
basic information to support probable cause at an open hearing or adversarial 
proceeding.  In fact, the Juvenile Court Rules now perversely prohibit presen-
tation of evidence at certification hearings to demonstrate or challenge the 
strength of the charges.213  Such a process would involve little more than is 
required at adult preliminary hearing proceedings to test the strength of the 
prosecution’s case214 – hearings that take place every day in Missouri’s adult 
  
detention hearing, when students presented arguments to demonstrate serious doubts 
as to the evidence against their client, based upon exculpatory statements of two wit-
nesses the students provided to the prosecution, the prosecution argued such infor-
mation was irrelevant to the detention hearing and could not be considered until the 
time of trial.  The court agreed. 
 208. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (2012). 
 209. 383 U.S. 541, 566-68 (1963); see ALEXANDRA RIECK, CIVIL JUSTICE CLINIC, 
A YOUTH ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO MISSOURI’S JUVENILE CERTIFICATION STATUTE 
(2010), available at http://law.wustl.edu/civiljustice/JR-REP/PLC/MissouriCertifi- 
cationStatute.pdf. 
 210. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-68. 
 211. See Jarod K. Hofacket, Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for  
a Child to Be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 168-      
69 (2002). 
 212. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071.  “Prosecutive merit” is the term used in the Kent 
factor addendum.  See Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.  It has been interpreted to mean proba-
ble cause.  See RIECK, supra note 209 (noting that at least thirty-five states require 
probable cause showings during certification hearings).  
 213. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 129.04, cmt. (“Rule 129.04c does not require or permit a 
full hearing into the facts of the alleged offense”). 
 214. In fact the Kent appendix described the level of proof as being sufficient to 
support indictment.  Kent, 383 U.S. at 567. 
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criminal courts.215  Instead, Missouri’s system – as a matter of codified law – 
allows for juvenile cases to be transferred to the circuit courts for adult crimi-
nal prosecution based on relatively weak evidence.   
While apparently permissible under current state statutes and rules, such 
a practice lacks integrity and runs contrary to basic due process principles.  
Indeed it is fundamentally unfair for the prosecuting attorney to have a child 
sanctioned with the “death penalty” of juvenile court proceedings – juvenile 
transfer – without ever having to present some level of substantiating       
evidence in the light of day.  Missouri is one of only a small minority of 
states that have failed to adopt the Kent probable cause factor.216  It is part    
of an even smaller group in failing to provide for probable cause hearings at 
either the detention or certification hearing stage.217  And it appears to be the 
only state that affirmatively bars any effort to address probable cause or a 
lack thereof at a waiver hearing.218  This outlier status once again speaks vol-
umes about the failure of Missouri’s juvenile law system to adopt evolving 
standards that reflect a modern society, and suggests seriously viable consti-
tutional challenges.  
3.  Informal Process as Punishment 
Additional unfair juvenile court practices have managed to emerge 
where system actors have developed a range of informal processes that work 
to degrade, demoralize, and damage vulnerable youth.219  For example, start-
ing in 2006, Missouri began receiving funds under the Juvenile Detention 
Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) program sponsored by the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation.220  Under the program, St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and 
  
 215. Cf. MO. SUP. CT. R. 22.09 (describing the procedure for felony prelimin-    
ary hearings). 
 216. See RIECK, supra note 209 (listing a number of states that have adopted 
probable cause requirement). 
 217. For instance, while California also fails to expressly provide for prosecutive 
merit determinations at certification hearings, it requires such findings at the        
detention hearing stage.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 635 (West 2000) (judicial 
officer must determine whether the prosecutor has proven a prima facie case that the 
child committed a crime in addition to other risk factors before ordering a child’s pre-
trial detention). 
 218. See generally PATRICK GRIFFIN, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE 
TRANSFER PROVISIONS (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/trying 
juvasadult/toc.html. 
 219. See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: 
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979). 
 220. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, JUVENILE DETENTION ALTERNATIVES 
INITIATIVE: 2011 ANNUAL RESULTS REPORT 1 (Feb. 25, 2013), available at  
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/Juvenile%20Detention%20Alternatives
%20Initiative/JDAIResultsReport2011/JDAIResults2011.pdf (“The Juvenile Deten-
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other localities agreed to utilize risk assessment instruments to screen young 
people in order to determine who presented the highest probability for danger 
or reoffending.221  Only those youths identified during the screening process 
were to have their liberty restricted by secure detention, which is a last resort 
intended only for the most dangerous or problematic youth.222 
To facilitate these practices, in 2011 the Supreme Court of Missouri is-
sued a rule of practice that requires counties to utilize risk assessment instru-
ments during the intake process to help fight disproportionate minority pretri-
al detentions and unnecessary restraints on liberty.223  But in the three years 
that the JLJC clinic regularly practiced in the St. Louis County courts, we 
were never provided with a risk assessment instrument for a client.  Further-
more, any requests we made for such documentation were never satisfied and 
not a single detention hearing involved presentation of or discussion about 
JDAI forms.   
Beyond this, following the launch of the JDAI project, tremendous net 
widening appears to have occurred in Missouri.  For instance, countless chil-
dren arrested in both St. Louis City and St. Louis County are now released 
from detention with strict legal conditions imposed, such as continual house 
arrest, evening visits to their home by marked police cars, or having electron-
ic monitoring devices attached to their bodies.224  But in our experience this 
has been the case for nearly every juvenile – from youths charged with non-
violent crimes, to first time misdemeanants, to teens with no record of flight.  
Thus even low-risk youth are ordered to attach twenty-four-hour monitoring 
systems to their ankles.225  These are cumbersome devices that can be seen by 
  
tion Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) is a nationwide effort of local and state juvenile 
justice systems, initiated and supported by the Annie E. Casey Foundation (AECF), to 
eliminate unnecessary and inappropriate use of secure detention for juveniles.”); MO. 
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 5 (2012), available 
at..http://dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/jj/documents/2011AnnualReportGovernor.pdf.. 
[hereinafter 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR].  
 221. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO GOVERNOR, supra note 220, at 5 (when it began in 
Missouri, “[t]he JDAI was implemented in St. Louis City, and the Counties of St. 
Louis, Jackson, Buchanan, Greene, Cass, and Johnson”). 
 222. See St. Louis City JDAI Form (on file with author). 
 223. See MO. SUP. CT. OP. R. 28.01 (creating presumption of pre-trial release and 
requiring use of a juvenile alternative to detention risk assessment form prior to any 
hold in secure detention); see also Missouri Taking JDAI to Scale, ANNIE E. CASEY 
FOUNDATION: JDAI NEWS (Summer 2011), available at http://www.aecf. 
org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative/Resources/JDAI/2011/Su
mmer%202011/Feature%20Story/Missouri%20taking%20JDAI%20to%20scale.aspx. 
 224. See ST. LOUIS FAMILY COURT: JUVENILE DIVISION, DETENTION 
ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM (2013), available at http://www.stlcitycircuitcourt. 
com/juvenile/2013%20Juv%20docs/DAP.pdf [hereinafter DETENTION ALTER-
NATIVES PROGRAM]. 
 225. Some of these are global positioning systems; others are less modern ver-
sions of the same kind of technology. 
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others; beyond monitoring every move of the young person and being uncom-
fortable to wear, the devices serve to stigmatize youths without any prior 
finding of guilt.  And, of course, these devices are attached almost exclusive-
ly to poor youth of color.226  If they fail to wear the monitor they will be held 
in Missouri’s most secure detention centers, where they will sleep in cement 
cells while they await trial.227   
A related under-the-radar outgrowth of injustice involves widespread  
re-arrest practices of youth alleged to have violated such conditions.  Based 
on the experience of the JLJC, countless young people are rounded up from 
their homes and schools each year by Missouri juvenile officers and law en-
forcement agents who execute ex parte warrants and writs of attachment for 
children.228  Such warrants may be executed where youth allegedly failed to 
stay inside while on house arrest, did not answer when police knocked on 
their door at night, or failed to keep their monitoring devices properly 
charged with batteries.229   
Rather than providing assigned counsel with notice of the alleged viola-
tions or humanely summoning the youths to address the new allegations, the 
assumption is that they must be guilty of the violations.  Once in custody, 
children have faced further charges of “violation of a valid court order.”230  If 
youth allegedly violate home detention rules on more than one day or in more 
than one way, they may be made to answer for several counts.231  
But use of arrest warrants and writs of attachment are appropriate only 
under extraordinary circumstances – not when the respondent is a child 
whose whereabouts are well known, and the issue under review is a technical 
violation of release terms.232  In addition, Missouri law does not include a 
  
 226. In one case where JLJC’s student attorneys argued that such a monitor was 
unnecessary and stigmatizing the juvenile court commissioner asked the child where 
he attended school.  After hearing the child’s response the commissioner indicated 
that all the kids there wear monitors, so it would not be a big deal for her to order our 
client to wear one, too.   
 227. This author was recently told by a juvenile officer that there is no such thing 
as “release on recognizance” for youth in her county.  She had never heard of such a 
practice or seen an order where a child was released without conditions.  These, she 
explained, usually included house arrest and/or body monitors.  But see MO. SUP. CT. 
OP. R. 28.01 (authorizing the “release with or without conditions pending hearing”). 
 228. In an appeal still in progress, JLJC is seeking to challenge such ex parte 
communications about youth on probation, which are actually set forth as a condition 
of a youth’s probation in St. Louis County. (Conditions on file with author).    
 229. JLJC has represented young people who were arrested and/or faced sanctions 
for all of the above allegations. 
 230. Cf. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.063 (2000). 
 231. DETENTION ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM, supra note 224224 (listing possible 
sanctions for violating home detention rules). 
 232. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.101 (2000) (describing limiting circum-
stances when court may issue an order to have a youth brought to court “at once” to 
respond to summons); MO. REV. STAT. § 211.131 (2000) (allowing for child to be 
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crime of “violation of a valid court order” nor does the Juvenile Code include 
such a charge as a status offense or otherwise.233  Indeed, in countless peti-
tions the JLJC clinic has seen alleging such technical violations, most fail to 
cite any supporting provision of law or specific elements for the alleged 
charge.234  Moreover, allegations are in many instances premised on viola-
tions of terms and conditions that are vaguely written,235 contained in docu-
ments that were never addressed in open court, included in documents drawn 
up by the juvenile officer outside of court, or were never fully explained by 
the judge or court officer.236   
Beyond all of this, young people who may be innocent of the initial 
charges can suddenly find themselves adjudicated delinquent based on the 
non-crime of violating their conditions of pretrial release and then be placed 
on formal probation.  Again, these violations may be conditions that should 
not have been imposed in the first place because the youths were never can-
didates for secure detention and should have been released on their own re-
cognizance without any terms of release. 
Once placed on probation, such youths often find themselves running 
through a similar gauntlet.  That is, with the court imposing bare-bones pro-
bation conditions but having its juvenile officers – off the record, outside the 
courtroom, and without any attorney present – issue additional conditions for 
the youth to follow.  Indeed, in St. Louis County it was the ongoing practice 
of juvenile officers to draw up an additional set of conditions within fifteen 
days of dispositional hearings to be later submitted for approval by the 
judge.237  But in cases where youths were represented by the public defend-
  
taken into custody for violation of a law or ordinance or when in danger).  In fact, 
many release contracts signed by youth make no mention at all of a new charge being 
brought in the case of a violation.    
 233. MO. REV. STAT.  § 211.431 (2000).  Cf. MO. REV. STAT.  § 211.063 (2000) 
(providing that a child alleged to have committed a status offense may not be held in 
secure detention for more than twenty-four hours unless a probable cause hearing is 
held at which it is also shown the child is in violation of valid court order and at least 
one other aggravating factor exists). 
 234. Petitions on file with author. 
 235. In numerous cases handled by JLJC, the order issued in court suggests one 
set of rules or conditions but supplemental materials drafted by the juvenile officer 
after the fact include additional or different rules.   
 236. In one case JLJC learned from a court officer that when the juvenile officer 
visited a child’s home to set up the GPS system, she did not go over the rules of the 
program with him or adequately explain his movement restrictions.  When he was 
later charged with violating those conditions, we subpoenaed that officer to testify at 
the “trial” on the new allegations of violation of a valid court order.  Despite having 
been served with a subpoena by JLJC’s student attorneys, the officer was sent away 
from court on the day of trial to take care of court business a few counties away.  We 
were never able to elicit his testimony on the record. 
 237. Sample Supplemental Conditions with 15-Day Instruction (on file            
with author). 
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er’s office, the court also relieved the assigned attorney at the time of disposi-
tion.238  Thus, in essence, a second informal dispositional proceeding would 
take place without the involvement of attorneys for the youth. 
The conditions imposed after the fact by juvenile officers generally are 
not merely technical or insignificant.  In fact, the JLJC clinic brought to light 
a three-part set of conditions implemented by juvenile officers under the 
court’s policies that likely violate not only the constitutional rights of impact-
ed youth, but also state and federal criminal laws.239  Specifically, youth in St. 
Louis County are generally required to turn over all of their social media 
passwords to their juvenile officers so that the officers can sign on as the 
youths to monitor their online behaviors.240  The youths are also prohibited 
from sending pictures, videos, or messages involving drugs, alcohol, sex, 
nudity, or violence.241  Finally, upon the request of the juvenile officer, such 
youths are required to make available for search and review all cellular tele-
phones and electronic devices that they use.242  Despite our efforts to have the 
court and its staff refrain from further imposing such unlawful conditions, and 
our national recognition for such advocacy,243 the conditions are still in use. 
Given the lack of restrictions in Missouri’s Juvenile Code, a court may 
keep a young person on probation for many months or even years.244  
Throughout this period, it may force the child to comply with a range of con-
ditions that are sometimes enhanced over time.  When the child fails to fully 
satisfy the terms that were set, re-arrest is likely to occur, followed by the 
filing of a motion to modify disposition – essentially, a charge of violating 
probation.  Thus the cycle continues; public arrest by law enforcement, fol-
lowed by detention in secure facilities, and concluding with adjudication for 
non-crimes.245   
  
 238. See MO. REV. STAT. § 211.211(6) (2000) (allowing for removal of counsel at 
the time of disposition if no appeal will be taken); see also Sample St. Louis County 
Disposition Order (on file with author). 
 239. See EMILY PELLETIER, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 2012 JUVENILE 
DEFENDER RESOURCE GUIDE 28 (2012), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
2012_resource_guide/NJDC_ResourceGuide12.pdf (describing petition drafted by 
clinic students J. Benjamin Rosebrough and William Waller). 
 240. Id.; see also St. Louis County Social Media Probation Conditions (on file 
with author). 
 241. See St. Louis County Social Media Probation Conditions (on file              
with author). 
 242. Id.  
 243. See PELLETIER, supra note 239.  
 244. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.231. 
 245. It is difficult to ascertain the extent of this practice.  But in St. Louis County 
a total of 1,750 juvenile court cases were filed last year.  Of those, approximately 450 
represented original delinquency and/or status offense filings.  But 322 represented 
some kind of motion to modify.  Missouri Courts Supplement 2012: Table 41, availa-
ble at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=58747 (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).  
While not all of these were likely filed in delinquency matters – for instance, some 
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Each new arrest and adjudication for technical violations is added to the 
child’s juvenile court record.246  Therefore, the child has soon amassed a long 
juvenile court rap sheet where each contact is counted against them and inter-
preted as disrespect for the court and a propensity for criminality.  In reality, 
many of these violations stem from misunderstandings, lack of clarity in the 
rules, and youthful missteps associated with ordinary adolescent risk-taking 
and boundary testing.  In this way, Missouri’s juvenile courts are not address-
ing criminal activities but are largely engaging in morals policing and social 
control, primarily impacting youth in communities of color.247 
One practice that results in numerous re-arrests and detentions of       
impoverished African-American youth on probation is drug testing for traces 
of marijuana.  But suffering from addiction, as a matter of constitutional law, 
cannot be criminalized.248  And experimentation through sporadic marijuana 
use is little more than an ordinary adolescent behavior practiced by teens 
around the country.249  Thus, it appears that most youths who are being    
arrested and detained for positive marijuana tests – which may or may not   
be accurate250 – are being harshly and unduly punished for non-crimes or 
social misbehaviors.  At the very least, as a matter of public policy the     
juvenile courts operating in one of our nation’s most dangerous cities should 
have more important matters to address than teen marijuana use without   
further wrongdoing.    
  
may stem from child welfare cases – this high proportion of modification motions 
raises a series question worth further research.  Also worth further research is the 
number of motions to modify juvenile dispositions resolved without any attorney 
present in light of prevailing practices of relieving counsel at the time of disposition. 
 246. See MO. REV. STAT.  § 211.063 (2000). 
 247. See, e.g., Christine Patterson, Recommendations for Reducing Dispropor-
tionality and Disparity in Missouri Certification Decisions, CERTIFICATION RESEARCH 
BRIEF NO. 5 – MISSOURI OFFICE OF STATE COURTS (2013), available at 
http://law.wustl.edu/news/documents/DMCCRB5-RecommendationsFINAL.pdf 
(finding race-based disproportionality in Missouri’s juvenile detention and certifica-
tion decisions). 
 248. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).   
 249. See, e.g., Tom Ter Bogt et al., Economic and Cultural Correlates of Canna-
bis Use Among Mid-adolescents in 31 Countries, 101 ADDICTION 241 (2006) (finding 
that marijuana use is a normative behavior for teens across North America). 
 250. As this Article goes to press, JLJC is working on a case where a teen was 
accused of testing positive for marijuana based on a court-administered drug test.  
When tested at a certified laboratory, however, the client tested clean.  See, e.g., Mari-
lyn Huestes & Edward Cone, Differentiating New Marijuana from Residual Drug 
Excretion in Occasional Marijuana Users, 22 J. OF ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 445, 
451 (1998) (noting that some cannabis urinalyses may present false positive based on 
past rather than recent use); Robert DuPont & Werner Baumgartner, Drug Testing by 
Urine and Hair Analysis: Complementary Features and Scientific Issues, 70 
FORENSIC SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL 63 (1995) (explaining unreliability of urine sam-
ple testing for marijuana use).  
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It is easy to see, therefore, how youth may fail to successfully complete 
probation in Missouri’s juvenile courts and thus find themselves removed 
from their homes and placed in state custody.  Of the nearly 1,000 youth or-
dered into DYS in 2011, only 103 were removed from their communities for 
the most serious felonies under the law.251  The rest were accused of lower-
level offenses – including what have been termed violations of valid court 
orders and probation violations.252  
4.  Impoverished Juvenile Defense System 
Indigent defense representation services for Missouri’s court-involved 
youth are also deeply deficient. Through severe restrictions on funding, a lack 
of support for specialized youth advocacy, and a culture of confusion in state 
courts regarding zealous delinquency representation, the role of the juvenile 
defender has been greatly weakened in Missouri.  In fact, in some areas of 
Missouri it does not exist at all.  As a result, young people are often forced to 
represent themselves.  This, too, is a phenomenon that has largely escaped 
national attention.  However, a recent National Juvenile Defender Center 
(NJDC) study is now helping to change that.253 
After many years of reductions in its budget, the Missouri public de-
fender system is currently ranked forty-ninth in the country for funding.254  Its 
extreme lack of resources has been widely reported by the media both locally 
and nationally, making Missouri somewhat of an example of what states 
should not do.255  The Missouri Office of State Public Defender recently 
  
 251. DYS ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2011, supra note 43, at vi.  
 252. Id.  
 253. MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI: 
JUSTICE RATIONED, AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF 
JUVENILE DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 35 (2013), 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Missouri_Assessement.pdf.  
 254. Monica Davey, Budget Woes Hit Defense Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept, 9, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/09/10/us/10defenders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  The Missouri system ranks 
last in terms of financial eligibility standards, leaving some of the poorest adults and 
children in the country without court-appointed defense counsel.  See CATHY R. 
KELLY ET AL., MO. PUBLIC DEFENDER COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 
7 (2012), available at http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/about/FY2012Annual  
Report2.pdf (“According to recent reports, Missouri ranks 50th out of 50 states         
in income eligibility standards for public defender services, leaving a wide gap         
of ineligible defendants who, in reality, still lack the means to retain private counsel 
in the market.”). 
 255. See, e.g., Davey, supra note 254; Kathryn Wall, Public Defender Fight Hits 
Supreme Court, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Dec. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.news-leader.com/article/20111214/NEWS12/112140362/Missouri-
Supreme-Court-public-defender; see also Chris Dandurand, Note, Walking Out on the 
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turned to the Supreme Court of Missouri for assistance.256  The court ruled in 
favor of the defender system, recognizing the need for some offices to actual-
ly turn away potential clients because of the inability to effectively serve all 
assigned clients.257   
In response, prosecutors around the state organized to support a legisla-
tive intervention viewed by some as retaliation.258  As initially proposed, the 
legislation threatened to entirely dismantle public defender offices and farm 
cases to the lowest bidder.259  A compromise was ultimately reached that 
keeps the statewide defender system running, albeit under conditions that 
continue to seriously restrict its ability to provide quality representation.260   
Through all of this litigation and public debate about the lack of funding 
for Missouri’s public defenders, almost nothing has been said about how the 
problem impacts juveniles in particular.  But as described in the NJDC’s 
study, Missouri previously had specialized juvenile defender offices that were 
staffed by lawyers trained in juvenile law and representation.261  These offices 
were run by the state defender system.262  However, as the system had to re-
duce its services under extreme budget cuts, the specialized youth advocacy 
offices were among the first things to go.263  As a result, the rationing of ju-
venile representation continues.   
In some areas, like St. Louis, this has resulted in a single public defender 
being assigned to handle all cases filed in the local juvenile court system.264  
  
Check: How Missouri Abandoned its Public Defenders and Left the Poor to Pay the 
Bill, 76 MO. L. REV. 185, 186 (2011). 
 256. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n. v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597 
(Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 257. Id. at 612. 
 258. See Brennan David, Bill Aims to Alter Public Defender Caseload, COLUM. 
DAILY TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.columbiatribune. 
com/news/local/bill-aims-to-alter-public-defenders-caseload/article_3291b91e-6a48-
11e2-96f0-00127992bc8b.html (outlining Senator Stanley Cox’s efforts to overhaul 
the public defender system). 
 259. Id.  
 260. See H.R. 215, 97th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2013); see also Missouri Public 
Defenders Could See Caseloads Ease, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, May 31, 2013, 
available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-public-
defenders-could-see-caseloads-ease/article_22fcbf5a-ef4e-55b0-a82e-
b41288d79db7.html (describing compromise reached on overhaul). 
 261. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 253, at 54.  
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. One such local court processed approximately 2000 delinquency and status 
case referrals in 2012.  See FAMILY COURT ADMIN.: DIV. 30, CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
FAMILY COURT REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 4 (2012), available at http:// 
www.stlcitycircuitcourt.com/juvenile/2013%20Juv%20docs/Report%20to%20the%2
0Community%202012.pdf.  Over 500 of those youth were detained.  Id.  In contrast, 
based on my own observations, the prosecution in that same courthouse is supported 
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In other counties, it appears that the public defender’s office serves no youth 
at all.265  Volunteers and others, such as clinic students, are expected to fill 
the void when possible.266  In many instances, children facing prosecution in 
juvenile court have no lawyer at all.267  Juvenile defendants, like anyone else 
in conflict with the law, face threats to their liberty as a result of prosecution; 
they are, however, much less capable of understanding the system without a 
lawyer by their side. 
Yet in this environment, the voice of the juvenile defender has been si-
lenced.  Unlike other states,268  Missouri has almost nothing in the way of an 
organized juvenile defense bar.  Additionally, in recent years almost no train-
ings have been offered for those interested in serving as zealous advocates for 
youths prosecuted in juvenile court.269  Much of what is provided seems to 
fold the role of the guardian ad litem into the role of the defender, despite 
their very different roles and a youth’s constitutional right to a meaningful 
defense.270  Even the materials produced by the Missouri Bar about juvenile 
court practice are primarily written by non-juvenile defenders.271  Further-
more, important conversations impacting youth justice take place across the 
state each year without any trained juvenile defenders present.  From the 
DYS advisory board,272 to the Department of Public Safety’s Juvenile Justice 
Advisory Group,273 to monthly meetings at St. Louis juvenile courts during 
  
by four legal officers and numerous support staff, including DJOs.  Even in the most 
collegial and open-minded court system such state-sponsored disparity in resources 
must be seen as unfair to children and families. 
 265. See, e.g., KELLY ET AL., supra note 254, at 87 (2012 caseload for Sedalia, 
Missouri included no juvenile cases). 
 266. See SCALI ET AL., supra note 253, at 33 n.185. 
 267. Id. at 35. 
 268. See, e.g., About Us, TENN. ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., http://www. 
tacdl.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=53 (provid-
ing information about the group’s juvenile justice committee and juvenile defender 
listserv) (last visited Nov. 20, 2013); Juvenile Division, OFF. OHIO PUB. DEFENDER, 
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/Juvenile/Juvenile_Main.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 269. For instance, the Missouri Bar Association’s CLE page indicates             
“juvenile law” is an area in which courses are offered.  CLE Programs, MO. BAR, 
http://www.mobar.org/pv/Core/Events/Events.aspx (follow “Practice Area”         
hyperlink; then search “Juvenile Law”) (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  However,        
the only options listed under juvenile law are the Bar Association’s eight hour GAL 
Courses.  Id.  
 270. See id.  Here, too, some change may be afoot.  While this Article was head-
ing to press, the public defender system partnered with other groups, including JLJC 
and IVJDC, to host an important multi-day juvenile defense training program. 
 271. See, e.g., 21A MO. PRAC., FAMILY LAW, § 19:30 (3d ed.). 
 272. See Missouri Division of Youth Services Advisory Board, supra note 38. 
 273. This is a group that is mandated by federal law in order for the state to re-
ceive juvenile justice funding.  Missouri Juvenile Justice Advisory Group, MO. 
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which administrative decisions are made,274 trained juvenile defense lawyers 
have not been invited stakeholders.  
Finally, as demonstrated by some of the examples provided earlier in 
this Article,275 in many instances the voices of juvenile defenders are also 
silenced by the court system itself.  In addition to operating without adequate 
funding, training support, or opportunities to participate in statewide stake-
holder conversations, many youth advocates are met with resistance for en-
gaging in zealous advocacy.  Beyond my own experiences and those of my 
students, numerous juvenile attorneys across the state have shared with me 
their accounts of being privately or publically chastised by juvenile court staff 
and judges for fighting hard for their clients.  In a system where juvenile 
judges – whose behaviors go largely unchecked – have tremendous power,276 
both defenders and their clients are vulnerable to formal and informal judicial 
retaliation.277  It also leaves the entire system open to the kind of abuses that 
have damaged the reputations of other jurisdictions in recent years and ruined 
the lives of many youths.278   
  
  
BOARDS & COMMISSIONS, http://boards.mo.gov/userpages/Board.aspx?70 (listing 
Board members) (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 274. This author asked to be included at such meetings but the request was denied. 
 275. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text. 
 276. Last year only three juvenile court appeals were opened by the State Office 
of the Public Defender.  See KELLY ET AL., supra note 254254, at 65. 
 277. For example, I have heard of judges calling attorneys into chambers to tell 
them to withdraw particular motions or threatening to preclude them from practicing 
in the court if they do not abide by the court’s wishes.  The clinic has also experi-
enced similar pushback in both direct and more subtle forms. 
 278. Eyder Peralta, Pa. Judge Sentenced to 28 Years in Massive Juvenile Justice 
Bribery Scandal, NPR ONLINE (Aug. 11, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://www.npr. 
org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/08/11/139536686/pa-judge-sentenced-to-28-years-in-
massive-juvenile-justice-bribery-scandal (describing the “kids for cash” kick-back 
scandal). 
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C. Imprisoning Youth 
Ironically, in a state that purports to provide a kinder alternative to the 
harsh juvenile court placements used in other jurisdictions, Missouri has no 
problem shuttling high numbers of youth into Missouri’s adult prison system.  
In fact, Missouri currently has more than twice as many youthful offenders in 
its adult prisons than DYS will serve in one full year.279  Most of these indi-
viduals are African-American males, and many were sentenced as children to 
die behind bars.       
1.  Race and Justice by Geography 
Missouri prisons currently house almost 2,000 youthful offenders.280  In 
2011 alone, seventy-four children under the age of seventeen were certified 
by Missouri’s juvenile courts to stand trial as adults.281   More than two-thirds 
of these youth were African-American boys,282 and a high proportion came 
from the St. Louis area.283  In fact, over a period of several years St. Louis 
juvenile courts transferred no white children to adult courts – only African-
American youth.284   
While this phenomenon is not widely publicized, this year the Missouri 
Office of State Courts Administrator (OSCA) undertook a statistical study to 
examine racial inequity in the state’s juvenile courts.285  Ultimately, it identi-
fied a problem of “justice by geography” across the state.286  That is, despite 
claims by its juvenile justice leaders that they are engaging in successful in-
  
 279. See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 45.  
 281. See MJFD ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 44, at 62.  
 282. Id. (reporting that forty-nine African American boys and two African Ameri-
can girls were certified in 2011). 
 283. Id. at 62 (appendix of statistics demonstrates that twenty-two of the state’s 
total of seventy-four transferred youth came from the St. Louis area; twenty were 
African-American males and two were African-American females). 
 284. For instance, in 2010 St. Louis County certified twenty youth while St. Louis 
City certified fifteen.  MO. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADM’R, MISSOURI JUVENILE AND 
FAMILY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT CALENDAR 2010 62 (2010), available at 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=48791.  All were African-American boys.  Id.  
In 2009, the County sent twenty-three children to stand trial as adults, twenty-two 
were black males.  MO. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADM’R, MISSOURI JUVENILE AND 
FAMILY DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT CALENDAR 2010 71 (CY 2009), available at 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=42581.  The City certified thirteen youth that 
year – also exclusively African American boys.  Id.     
 285. See Patterson, supra note 247. 
 286. Id. at 1 (flagging “justice by geography” as a potential cause for the disparate 
certification of minority youth in St. Louis). 
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novations287 and working to reduce disproportionate minority contact with the 
penal system,288 youth of color remain disproportionately represented in St. 
Louis area juvenile courts.289  In fact, St. Louis City and County were identi-
fied as being responsible for the worst racial disparity statistics in the state.290  
While some might claim that this is simply a function of the population in 
these urban areas, African Americans account for less than twenty percent of 
the St. Louis area population.291  Rather, OSCA’s study suggests that the 
ways in which cases are reviewed and processed in these regions need to be 
more carefully reviewed to see how they may be contributing to such race-
based outcomes.292  In fact, many of the minority youth certified to stand trial 
presented a low chance of reoffending when screened under standardized risk 
assessment instruments.293 
2.  Forgotten and Unprotected 
When these young people – many of whom are unlikely to reoffend – 
enter the adult court system, their lives are forever changed.  First, in Mis-
souri once a young person is certified to stand trial as an adult on one case – 
even a crime of drug possession – they will be forever treated as an adult by 
the state’s justice system.294  Beyond this, as their case is converted from one 
about juvenile delinquency to one about adult crime, they are often thrust into 
an even more scary environment than the one they encountered in the juvenile 
court system.  On top of that, they must learn how to operate among an adult 
prison population.   
  
 287. Judge Edwards Named One of People Magazine’s 2011 ‘Heroes of the Year’, 
ST. LOUIS AM. (Oct. 28, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_ 
news/article_53c7bb7c-01a5-11e1-8446-001cc4c03286.html (describing Judge Ed-
wards’ establishment of an alternative school affiliated with his Juvenile Court); 
School of Last Resort Helps Troubled Youth, CBS NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7388761n. (claiming Judge Edwards took 
a “unique approach to turn young lives around” and would rather see kids “behind 
desks in schools rather than behind bars”). 
 288. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MINORITY YOUTH IN THE 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 7 (Jan. 2009), 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/minoritiesinjj.pdf. 
 289. See Patterson, supra note 247. 
 290. Id.; see also Kenneth J. Cooper, Despite Law on Racial Disparities, Black 
Teens Are Overly Tried as Adults, ST. LOUIS BEACON (May 10, 2011 10:20 AM), 
available at http://law.wustl.edu/clinicaled/documents/CJC-JLJC/Beacon-051011-
Certification Disparities.pdf. 
 291. See St. Louis Area Population Demographics, ST. LOUIS REGIONAL 
CHAMBER COM., http://www.stlrcga.org/x1832.xml (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 292. See Patterson, supra note 2477. 
 293. See id.  
 294. See GRIFFIN ET AL., supra note 218 (follow “Once an Adult/Always an 
Adult” hyperlink). 
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Notably, the period of time between when a child is transferred from ju-
venile court to adult court for criminal prosecution is a legal mystery in Mis-
souri.  It presents a kind of barren land with little in the way of express pro-
cesses or procedures controlling the treatment of such youth.  Instead, various 
informal practices have evolved over time, including the assumption that the 
child can be held in secure custody – including in adult jails – pending resolu-
tion of the charges.295   
For example, as this Article goes to press a Sedalia child charged at age 
thirteen with allegedly killing his stepfather is being held in an adult jail.296  
He has been there several years awaiting his trial.297  During this waiting pe-
riod, many youths – including the Sedalia boy – are routinely denied educa-
tional services and other programs available to youths in juvenile detention 
centers.298  Such treatment is so unfair that it has even drawn protest from 
Missouri’s attorney general.299   
Similarly, at the end of transfer hearings it is frequently assumed that 
appointed counsel has completed her work and that a new attorney must be 
appointed once the case is formally processed in criminal court.  Finding 
themselves “between the cracks” during this sometimes significant period of 
time, many of Missouri’s most at-risk youth must contend with the criminal 
justice system without the aid of counsel.300  Indeed, at a moment when such 
  
 295. 21A MO. PRAC., FAMILY LAW, § 19:30 (3d ed.) (“If the child is certified, the 
juvenile petition is dismissed, and the child is turned over to the county”); see In re 
ADR, 603 S.W.2d 575, 579-80 (Mo. 1980) (“Once the juvenile court has relinquished 
jurisdiction, the juvenile is subject to criminal prosecution as an adult.”); State v. 
Williams, 922 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996) (describing appellants move-
ment after juvenile court certification to the adult jail where he awaited trial on the 
charges against him).  
 296. Chelsea Wade, Court Proceedings Continue in Capps County Case, KMZU 
100.7 FM (Apr. 5, 2012, 1:29 AM), http://www.kmzu.com/court-proceedings-
continue-in-capps-murder-case/ (noting that while the child’s competence to stand 
trial is questioned he faces the possibility of a sentence of life without parole). 
 297. Id. 
 298. See State v. Bustamonte, No. 09AC-CR03516 (Cir. Ct. Cole Cty. June       
21, 2011). 
 299. Kevin Held, Attorney General Chris Koster Says Alyssa Bustamante Has 
Right to Education in Jail, KSDK (Oct. 19, 2010), http://archive.ksdk. 
com/news/crime/story.aspx?storyid=222452 (describing Attorney General Koster’s 
support for  Bustamonte’s request for educational services that were being denied by 
local officials). 
 300. See State v. Williams, 922 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996) (describ-
ing how one youth, after being certified to stand trial and housed at the local jail, was 
interviewed by a lawyer representing another defendant without the assistance of his 
own attorney to advise him against making statements); State v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 
79 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (upholding police questioning of a youth who, after juvenile 
court certification, was in jail awaiting appointment of criminal court attorney in 
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juveniles may feel most desperate, Missouri’s “model” system of justice 
shamefully fails to provide them with meaningful legal protections or sup-
port.  Sadly, such circumstances have led to tragedy – including suicide.301 
In one such tragic incident, sixteen-year-old Jonathan McClard took his 
own life while in his jail cell.302  He had just been sentenced to a thirty-year 
prison sentence.303  Knowing that he was being transferred to a maximum 
security prison, he gave up all hope.304  His family, devastated by the loss and 
outraged by Jonathan’s treatment by the justice system, has established a non-
profit organization called Families and Friends Organizing to Reform Juve-
nile Justice in Missouri (FORJ-MO).305  FORJ-MO, one of the few grass-
roots juvenile justice groups in the state, has worked hard to shed light on the 
problem of Missouri’s juvenile certification and transfer practices.  Tracy 
McClard, Jonathan’s mother, successfully convinced legislators last year to 
expand the availability of juvenile justice services for court-involved teens by 
modifying Missouri’s dual jurisdiction standards.306    
This was an important victory for Missouri youth advocates.  But the 
fundamental problem of indiscriminate and racially disproportionate certifica-
tion practices for youth under the age of seventeen remains.  And for youth 
who are under seventeen at the time of their prosecution, we can at least ac-
cess and track population data due to special juvenile court reporting stand-
ards.  Other children in Missouri’s adult criminal court system remain largely 
under the radar.  Although the Supreme Court of the United States has repeat-
edly held that seventeen year olds must be considered juveniles for purposes 
of due process standards and sentencing processes,307 Missouri continues to 
automatically prosecute such youth as adults.  Therefore, in addition to any 
children who are waived into adult court, the state’s criminal and municipal 
courts prosecute countless “direct filed” seventeen year olds each year – au-
tomatically sentencing these young people as adults.  Yet, their numbers are 
not contained in public reports or carefully monitored for issues of racial dis-
parity.  Instead, these children become almost invisible in a sea of adult crim-
inal defendants, their youth essentially forgotten and erased. 
  
murder case; the court found no violation of right to counsel as juvenile defense law-
yer was considered an attorney on “a different matter”).  
 301. See About Us, FAMILIES & FRIENDS ORGANIZING FOR REFORM JUV. JUSTICE-
MISSOURI (FORJ-MO), http://www.forj-mo.org/Default.aspx (describing the found-
ing of FORJ by Missouri parent Tracy McClard, whose son committed suicide after 
being certified to adult court and denied dual jurisdiction sentencing) (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2013). 
 302. See id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Graham v.    
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
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3.  Mandatory Death Behind Bars Sentences 
Finally, despite its alleged ground-breaking model of juvenile justice, 
Missouri is one of several states that has denied young people the opportunity 
for a second chance by way of mandatory life without parole sentences for 
children.  Under Missouri’s first degree murder statute, judges must impose 
automatic death behind bars sentences on children without hearing any evi-
dence relating to the facts of the crime, the developmental level of the youth, 
or their individual life circumstances.308   
After the Miller decision, which struck down such mandatory sentencing 
schemes, the Supreme Court of Missouri heard the cases of two similarly 
situated youths – Ledale Nathan and Laron Hart – whose matters were    
pending at the time Miller was decided.309  In those decisions, handed down 
in August 2013, the Court found that their mandatory death behind bars   
sentences amounted to unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.310      
It thus ordered new sentencing hearings at which the youth may present evi-
dence relating to their individual circumstances and youth.311  In addition,   
the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the very high evidentiary standard   
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for prosecutors who continue to seek 
juvenile life without parole sentences at such hearings.312  If the prosecution 
cannot meet this burden, the juveniles need to be resentenced within the sec-
ond-degree murder sentencing range – ten to thirty years, or life with eligibil-
ity for parole.313   
But the court has not reached the cases of the eighty-four youthful of-
fenders already serving death behind bars sentences, some of whom were 
only fourteen years old at the time of their crimes.314 In fact, as this Article 
goes to press the habeas corpus petitions of those youthful offenders remain 
on the Supreme Court of Missouri’s docket.  These petitions tell stories that 
have never before been shared – this is because, as a matter of law, they could 
not be told.  Missouri’s sentencing laws precluded the courts from learning 
anything about these children – again only hearing one side of the story.   
It is true that these are individuals who may have committed very seri-
ous crimes in their youth – some actually killing their victims, while others 
were merely present while other individuals committed homicidal acts.  But 
many were children who were themselves violently abused at the hands of 
their parents, left unattended and unfed by drug addicted guardians, forced to 
  
 308. See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2000). 
 309. State v. Nathan, 404 S.W.3d 253, 270 (Mo. 2013); State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 
232, 241-42 (Mo. 2013). 
 310. Nathan, 404 S.W. at 270; Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242. 
 311. Nathan, 404 S.W. at 270; Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242. 
 312. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 242-43, 253. 
 313. Nathan, 404 S.W. at 270-271; Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 243. 
 314. See Eastburn v. State, 400 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Mo. 2013). 
50
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/9
File: Quinn – Final Formatting 3/9/14 Created on: 4/15/2014 1:02:00 PM Last Printed: 4/15/2014 1:23:00 PM 
2013] THE OTHER “MISSOURI MODEL” 1243 
raise themselves in violent urban streets, or made to suffer from untreated 
mental health issues.  They were still developing as persons and citizens, with 
moral compasses still under construction and a sense of right and wrong that 
was not yet fully formed.  And nearly all of these eighty-four children were 
trying to negotiate these difficult life circumstances and the rocky terrain of 
adolescence while experiencing the widespread systemic societal neglect 
described above – a tragic network that has worked to the detriment of so 
many of Missouri’s poor, African-American boys, fundamentally undermin-
ing their ability to find their way.   
They are not asking to be absolved of all guilt, nor have they remained 
the children that they were at the time of their crimes.  Many have already 
served long sentences of nearly twenty, twenty-five, and thirty years in max-
imum security prisons.  They have educated themselves while behind bars, 
earning high school diplomas and college certifications, completed drug 
treatment programs, and undergone medication regimes not previously avail-
able to them.  Some have turned to religion, while others have become com-
munity leaders, serving as positive role models for younger inmates new to 
the system.  Their petitions seek nothing more than the opportunity for a sec-
ond chance – the same opportunity provided to Ledale and Hart – and some 
reason to have hope.315 
IV.  A SINGLE VISION: EVOLVING STANDARDS AND HOPE  
FOR THE DAYS AHEAD 
Until recently, only a single account of Missouri’s approach to juvenile 
justice was being shared and heard – one that suggested our state offers a 
model, modern system in all respects.  Unfortunately, the naturalizing of this 
narrative has glazed over the stories of youth who are currently incarcerated 
in Missouri’s prisons for the rest of their lives.  Also missing are the experi-
ences of children who may be placed in DYS despite very low-level charges, 
and those whose life chances may be reduced by Missouri’s failing schools, 
conflicted juvenile courts, and impoverished system of youth advocacy.  
Their experiences tell the story of the “other” Missouri Model. 
It is my hope that post-Miller implementation efforts, taken together 
with other recent events – including the release of the NJDC’s assessment of 
Missouri’s juvenile justice system, OSCA’s studies on continuing racial dis-
parity in the state, and now the investigation launched by the United States 
Department of Justice – will finally force us to come to terms with the whole 
story of Missouri’s treatment of youth.  
Only after we engage in such a full and honest accounting can we        
finally begin to develop a system of juvenile justice that improves the life 
  
 315. See supra note 4 (describing how the basic human right to hope has emerged 
as a concern on both the international human rights stage and in our own Supreme 
Court jurisprudence). 
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chances of Missouri’s most vulnerable children.  Missouri cannot claim to be 
innovative in its treatment of adolescents while simultaneously pushing them 
out of school, capturing them in the juvenile court system, denying them 
meaningful assistance of counsel, and locking them behind bars until death 
without ever hearing their stories.  Instead, Missouri needs to fully embrace 
the virtues it has been extolling for years if it wants to reap the benefits of 
being called a model of juvenile justice.  The time is now for the Show Me 
State to meet its burden of developing more evolved standards of decency for 





316 Guide to the Family Court, FAM. CT. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, 5 (March 2002), 
http://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document%20Library/circuit%20court/Fam
ily%20Court/NewFamilyCourtGuide.pdf (last revised Feb. 2010). 
52
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss4/9
